Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

148 THE DEFENCE OF PNCPerhaps this argument looks simple (certainly it is valid). But it raisesfundamental and difficult questions. In particular, the third premise (P3‘It is possible to think and speak about things’), which may appearunobjectionable, can be understood in two very different ways. <strong>Aristotle</strong>, itappears, understands it to mean that we can think and speak about thethings themselves, not just about things as they appear to us and as weconceive of them. But if this is what he means, then this premise is not sounobjectionable after all, and the disputant may want to deny it (we willtake up this important issue in Chapter 6).Here it is important to emphasize that <strong>Aristotle</strong> wants the premises tobe acceptable to the disputant. For he thinks that when the disputantdenies PNC, it is first of all he, the disputant, that is committed tounacceptable consequences, and in particular to the view that thought andlanguage about things is impossible. In fact, <strong>Aristotle</strong> says that the personwho denies PNC somehow refutes himself (see 1006 a 26, 1008 b 2f.). So hethinks that his refutation of the person who denies PNC amounts to whatis now sometimes called a ‘self-refutation’, i.e. the disputant’s refutingthemself. But then it is especially important that we should understand thepremises in such a way that they are acceptable not only to <strong>Aristotle</strong>, butalso to the disputant.In general, the structure of the refutation of those who deny PNC is asfollows. The disputant denies PNC and claims that PNC is not true ofthings. <strong>Aristotle</strong> argues that if PNC is not true of things, then thought andlanguage about things are impossible. But naturally the disputant believesthat thought and language about things are possible. So they arecommitted to a contradiction. In ordinary circumstances, this would forcethem to give up one of these two beliefs. And since it is difficult to give upthe belief that thought and language about things is possible, they wouldrather give up the denial of PNC. The disputant, however, is prepared toaccept contradictions, so they cannot be refuted in this usual way. But<strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks that they can still be refuted, in a striking way:If he [the disputant] says nothing [i.e. if he really accepts thatlanguage is impossible], it is ridiculous to try to say somethingagainst one who does not have a statement to make about anything,in so far as he is like that; for such a person is to that extent alreadylike a vegetable.(1006 a 13–15)So what is intended to disturb the disputant is not so much that denyingPNC commits them to a contradiction; for they are prepared to accept