Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

170 PHENOMENALISM AND RELATIVISMrigorously the way in which <strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks that the denial of PNC-M isrelated to phenomenalism and relativism:(P1) PNC is not true of the things themselves if, and only if, thethings themselves are radically indeterminate.(P2) The things themselves are radically indeterminate if, andonly if, either all appearances and all beliefs are true (i.e.phenomenalism) or all appearances and all beliefs are true relative tothe one who has them (i.e. relativism).Therefore,(C) PNC is not true of the things themselves if, and only if, eitherphenomenalism is true or relativism is true.Earlier (in Chapter 5) we looked at length at premise P1, which he defendsin IV. 4. Here (in IV. 5–6) <strong>Aristotle</strong> will defend premise P2, and we willconcentrate on this defence now. The defence of premise P2 involvesconsiderable complexity, but it can also be understood in a more generaland informal way. (The following is an overall interpretation of IV. 5,1009 a 38–b15 and IV. 6, 1011 a 17– b 6. We will first present the argumentin a general and informal way, then concentrate on its complex individualsteps.) Suppose that we believe that the things themselves are radicallyindeterminate. Then it is natural to reason as follows: if the thingsthemselves are radically indeterminate, then it is impossible to think orspeak of the things themselves; so we can, at best, think and speak aboutthings as they appear to us and as we conceive them. Kratylus, whom<strong>Aristotle</strong> presents as having ended up merely moving his finger, reasons injust this way (1010 a 7–13): all things are always changing in every way, andthere is nothing constant about anything, so in this way things are radicallyindeterminate; but then it is impossible to think or speak about anythingat all—which is why he ended up merely moving his finger. Kratylusevidently takes this reasoning to an extreme and perhaps unnecessaryconclusion: it is impossible to think or speak of anything at all.But this extreme conclusion may be avoidable; for if we draw asufficiently sharp distinction between the things themselves and things asthey appear to us, then we may rather conclude that although it isimpossible to think or speak of the things themselves (since they areradically indeterminate), we can still think and speak about things as theyappear to us and as we conceive them. But this conclusion, apparently, isdistinctive of phenomenalism and relativism. This is because it is distinctiveof phenomenalism and especially of relativism to draw a sharp distinction