Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

5 Is PNC Transcendental, i.e. is It True of Things Because it is 135True of Thought?6 How Can One Deny PNC? 1387 The Consequences of Denying PNC: It is Impossible to Think and 146Speak About Things8 The Defence of PNC and the Defence of the View That Things 150Have an Essence9 Does <strong>Aristotle</strong> Succeed in Showing That There Are No True 153Contradictions?6 The Response to Phenomenalism and Relativism (Book 157IV. 5–6)1 How Phenomenalism and Relativism Present a Challenge to<strong>Aristotle</strong>’s Defence of the Principle of Non-contradictionConceived as a Metaphysical Principle1572 The Characterization of Phenomenalism and Relativism 1623 The Aim of Considering Phenomenalism and Relativism 1664 The Relation Between Phenomenalism, Relativism, and the 169Denial of PNCi General 169ii Tracing the source of phenomenalism and of the denial of PNC 172iii A central consequence of phenomenalism and the denial of PNC: 179relativism5 How Far Does <strong>Aristotle</strong> Succeed in Defending PNC Conceived as 183a Metaphysical Principle?7 The Search for Primary Being (Book VII) 1901 The Question at the Centre of the Metaphysics: ‘What is 190Primary Being?’ (Prōtē Ousia, Often Simply Ousia) (VII. 1–2)2 Initial Suggestions and Candidates for What Primary Being May 195Turn Out to be (VII. 1)3 Three Main Candidates for Primary Being: The UltimateSubject of Predication; the Universals; and the Essence (VII. 3)198vii