Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

36 THE ULTIMATE EXPLANATIONS OF ALL THINGSSense perception (aisthēsis) is necessary and sufficient for particularknowledge (e.g. the knowledge that this particular tree has leaves).Experience (empeiria) is necessary for non-explanatory generalknowledge (e.g. the knowledge that trees have leaves); andperception and experience are jointly necessary and sufficient forsuch knowledge.Science or art (epistēmē, technē) is necessary for explanatory generalknowledge (e.g. the knowledge why trees have leaves); andperception, experience and science or art are jointly necessary andsufficient for such knowledge.This shows that <strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks that there is a progression and ascent ofknowledge, with three main steps. The first step is particular knowledge,which is acquired through sense perception. The second step is nonexplanatorygeneral knowledge, which is acquired through experience. Thethird step is explanatory general knowledge, which is acquired throughscience or art. These steps are related as follows: each step is necessary fortaking the next, but not sufficient. In other words, each step relies on theprevious step, but it also goes decisively beyond it.<strong>Aristotle</strong> makes a further claim at the opening of the Metaphysics, whichis central to understanding his distinction between non-explanatory andexplanatory knowledge: experience is knowledge of particulars, but scienceand art are knowledge of universals. He says:Experience is knowledge of particulars [ta kath’ hekasta], but art[technē; but he intends the point to be true also of science, epistēmē]is knowledge of universals [ta katholou].(981 a 15–16)So non-explanatory knowledge, including experience, is knowledge ofparticulars, for example, particular trees; but explanatory knowledge isknowledge of universals. We will see that by ‘universals’ here he meansabove all: natural kinds, kinds associated with distinctions in reality.<strong>Aristotle</strong>’s claim that non-explanatory knowledge, including experience,is knowledge of particulars and not also of universals may appear puzzling,since he also thinks that experience is a kind of general knowledge: it isnon-explanatory general knowledge. For how can he think that experienceis knowledge of particulars and not also of universals, but also think that