Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

174 PHENOMENALISM AND RELATIVISMtime but in respect of different senses (e.g. sight and touch). For example,the wine that tastes sweet to the healthy person tastes bitter to a personthat is ill (see 1009 b 3–5; it is interesting to compare Plato’s Theaetetus, e.g.166el-4). Indeed, there is conflict in general among the beliefs of differentpeople. For example, people that are mad, or temporarily besidethem selves, think thoughts and hold beliefs different from and conflictingwith those of sane people (see 1009 b 4–6, b 28–33). In short:2. Sense perceptions, and beliefs in general, conflict with eachother.STEP 3The fact that sense perceptions, and beliefs in general, conflict with eachother may be part of the source of phenomenalism, but evidently it is notsufficient to generate phenomenalism. For perhaps there is a way, or ways,of determining which sense perceptions and beliefs are true and which arefalse. If there is such a way, or ways, we evidently need not conclude thatall sense perceptions (or all appearances based on sense perceptions) and allbeliefs are true. So we need not conclude that phenomenalism is true. Butperhaps phenomenalism will emerge, if we think not only that senseperceptions and beliefs conflict, but that there is no adequate way ofdetermining which sense perceptions and beliefs are true and which false,i.e. if we think that there is no criterion of truth with regard to senseperceptions and in general with regard to beliefs. So, in order to generatephenomenalism, we need to add:3. It is apparently impossible to resolve conflicts among senseperceptions and in general among beliefs.In this way <strong>Aristotle</strong> points out that this claim (i.e. 3) is an important partof a line of reasoning in support of phenomenalism (see 1009 b 2f.).STEP 4But will phenomenalism emerge, even if we suppose that sense perceptionsand beliefs conflict (i.e. 2) and that apparently it is impossible adequatelyto resolve such conflict (i.e. 3)? <strong>Aristotle</strong> points out an important reasonfor thinking that the combination of these two views (i.e. 2 and 3) is still notsufficient to generate phenomenalism. For even if, for example, some wineappears to some people to be sweet, but appears to other people not to besweet, and even if apparently such conflict cannot be resolved, i.e. even if