Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

112 BEING QUA BEING AND PRIMARY BEINGultimate subject of predication with regard to a particular thing, such as,for instance, Socrates.Consider, for example, a particular human being, Socrates, and supposethat he is snub-nosed. Evidently being snub-nosed is not the ultimatesubject of predication with regard to Socrates, for it is something otherthan Socrates and something that is predicated of him. In particular, beingsnub-nosed is true of Socrates, but it is true of him only accidentally (katasumbebēkos), not essentially (kath’ hauto). That is to say, being snub-nosedis true of Socrates not in virtue of his being the very thing he is (kath’hauto), but in virtue of something else, namely, snub-nosedness, being trueof him. In general, by the ‘accidental properties’ (ta sumbebēkota) of athing <strong>Aristotle</strong> means those properties which the thing has not in virtue ofits being the very thing it is (kath’ hauto), but in virtue of something elsebeing true of it. So, in general, the accidental properties of a thing are notthe ultimate subjects of predication with regard to that thing, for they eachare something other than the thing and something that is predicated of itand true of it.But what about the essence of a thing—is this perhaps the ultimatesubject of predication with regard to the thing? For example, let ussuppose that Socrates’ essence is being human or his being human. (Wewill see in a moment that it makes a crucial difference whether his essenceis being human, i.e. something that he shares with other human beings, orit is his being human, i.e. something that he does not share with otherhuman beings. But let us set aside this point for a moment.) Is Socrates’essence the ultimate subject of predication with regard to Socrates? Thisquestion is central to understanding <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s metaphysics. For in theCategories he argues that the essence of a thing is not the ultimate subject ofpredication with regard to that thing; but in the Metaphysics he argues, onthe contrary, that the essence of a thing is precisely the ultimate subject ofpredication with regard to that thing. This is a fundamental change ofmind, and it is of central importance to understanding <strong>Aristotle</strong>’smetaphysics.In the Categories <strong>Aristotle</strong> argues that the ultimate subject of predicationwith regard to a thing cannot be the essence of the thing. For he arguesthat the essence of a thing is a universal, and evidently a universal ispredicated of something, it is not that of which something is predicated(see e.g. Categories 2 b 29f.). For example, let us suppose that Socrates’essence is being human, and let us suppose (as <strong>Aristotle</strong> does in theCategories) that this essence is a universal: being human. Then evidentlythe essence of Socrates cannot be the ultimate subject of predication withregard to Socrates; for evidently the universal, being human, is something