Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

BEING QUA BEING AND PRIMARY BEING 115However, to make further progress with this fundamental question, i.e. thequestion whether the essence of a thing can be the ultimate subject ofpredication with regard to that thing, we really have to face up to thefollowing question: is Socrates’ essence simply being human, i.e. is itsomething that he shares with other things of the same general kind, or isSocrates’ essence rather his being human, i.e. something that he does notshare with other things of the same general kind? If Socrates’ essence issomething that he shares with other things of the same general kind, e.g. withPlato, then it is hard to see how Socrates’ essence can be the ultimatesubject of predication with regard to him. For the ultimate subject ofpredication with regard to any one particular thing is not shared withother particular things of the same general kind. For example, the ultimatesubject of predication with regard to Socrates, i.e. that of which all thethings that are said of Socrates are ultimately said of, is, precisely, thisparticular thing, Socrates; it is not also any other particular thing of thesame general kind, e.g. Plato. So if we are to suppose that Socrates’ essencecan somehow be the ultimate subject of predication with regard to him, wemust suppose that Socrates’ essence is not simply being human, but ratherhis being human, i.e. something that he does not share with other thingsof the same general kind.We will see later (in Chapter 7§5viii) that it is controversial whether<strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks that a thing’s essence is something that it shares with otherthings of the same general kind or whether he thinks that a thing’s essenceis something that it does not share with other things of the same generalkind. (We will argue for the latter interpretation, but the formerinterpretation is also common.) But let us note straight away that <strong>Aristotle</strong>himself raises this question: is a thing’s essence something that it shares, oris it something that it does not share with other things of the same generalkind? For in book III, the book of problems or aporiai, he asks: Areprinciples one in kind or one in number? (see the ninth aporia, 999 b 24–100 a 4) In other words, are there as many principles as there are particularthings (so that my principle and your principle are different, although webelong to the same general kind) or are there as many principles as thereare general kinds of things (so that my principle and your principle are thesame) ? But it has emerged in the meanwhile that the essence of things is afundamental principle, i.e. an ultimate explanation of why things are asthey are. So the question that <strong>Aristotle</strong> raises in the ninth aporia is a moregeneral version of precisely this question: is a thing’s essence somethingthat it shares, or is it something that it does not share with other things ofthe same general kind? So we must not begin by prejudging this question,either by assuming that he thinks that a thing’s essence is something that it