Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

34 THE ULTIMATE EXPLANATIONS OF ALL THINGSdirectly from sense perception. But the induction also goes beyond senseperception; for it generates general knowledge on the basis of many piecesof particular knowledge, each of which is acquired through senseperception. We should note, however, that the term in <strong>Aristotle</strong>, epagōgē,which is commonly translated as ‘induction’, is crucially broader thaninduction by enumeration; for although apparently it includes inductionby enumeration, it includes also the putting forward of explanatoryhypotheses.Perhaps the kind of reasoning that <strong>Aristotle</strong> associates with experience(empeiria) may involve more than simply induction by enumeration; itmay also involve an ability to recognize relevantly similar cases. We maythink of an effective but non-scientific physician. But what is particularlyimportant for our purpose is <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s view that the kind of reasoningthat is associated with the capacity for experience (empeiria), whateverexactly it may involve, is not sufficient for explanatory knowledge; for hethinks that experience provides non-explanatory general knowledge, butnot explanatory general knowledge. Evidently he thinks that there is afundamental distinction between non-explanatory general knowledge (e.g.the knowledge that fire is hot) and explanatory general knowledge (e.g. theknowledge why fire is hot); and the former is not sufficient for the latter.This view may perhaps seem puzzling, especially if we arrive at it from aHumean philosophy of science which argues that general knowledgecannot go beyond induction by enumeration. But there is also somethingvery plausible about a view which says that while no more than inductionby enumeration may be required for non-explanatory general knowledge,what is required for explanatory general knowledge is explanatory theories.<strong>Aristotle</strong> argues that the putting forward of such theories, or ‘universalsuppositions’, as he calls them here (katholou hupolēpseis, see 981 a 6–7),will involve reflecting on the general knowledge already arrived at throughexperience:Art [technē, i.e. the kind of explanatory knowledge relevant to, forexample, medicine] comes about when a single universalsupposition about the similar cases is generated from a variety ofthoughts belonging to experience.(981 a 5–7)For example (from his example in 981 a 7–12), the non-scientific physicianmay possess the general knowledge that patients who exhibit such and suchbehaviour generally respond in such and such a way to such and such adrug. But the scientific physicians will ask, what is it about such patients