Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

THE DEFENCE OF PNC 141It is sometimes thought that <strong>Aristotle</strong> does not at all clearly distinguishbetween the view that some contradictions are true and the view that allcontradictions are true; and that this spoils his defence of PNC. ThusPriest writes: ‘<strong>Aristotle</strong>, in fact, slides back and forth between ‘all’ and ‘some’with gay abandon. His defence of the LNC [i.e. PNC] is therefore of littlehelp.’ (Priest 1998:417.) But it appears that the truth is rather that<strong>Aristotle</strong> does clearly distinguish between the view that some contradictionsare true and the view that all contradictions are true, and that he deliberatelychooses to concentrate primarily on the latter view, in his defence of PNC.So the question is, why does <strong>Aristotle</strong> deliberately choose to concentrate onthe radical view that all contradictions are true, in his defence of PNC?And how, in <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s view, will the response to the radical denial ofPNC, i.e. to the view that all contradictions are true, contribute to theresponse to the moderate denial of PNC, i.e. to the view that somecontradictions are true? (We will return to this question later, in §9 of thischapter.)In general, <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s strategy here (in IV. 4–6) appears to bediagnostic: he wants to trace the denial of PNC back to its root source, i.e.to trace the line of reasoning—the best line of reasoning—that thedisputant of PNC can set out in support of the denial of PNC. He wantsto do this in order that he may then direct his examination and response atthis root source of the denial of PNC. But he thinks that an important lineof reasoning for the denial of PNC is the view that things are radicallyindeterminate (aorista). So he directs his examination above all at thisview.However, it will emerge that this view, i.e. the view that things areradically indeterminate, has an inherent tendency towards being a globaland not just a local view. That is to say, it is hard to think that some thingsare radically indeterminate, without thinking that all things are radicallyindeterminate. <strong>Aristotle</strong> himself makes this important point (see 1008 a 11–12). For suppose that only some things are radically indeterminate. Butthen we must ask, which things are they? Suppose that we identifysomething radically indeterminate, e.g. clouds or sub-atomic particles.Evidently, even if these things are not wholly determinate, they are notradically indeterminate; for they differ and can be distinguished from otherthings. We have, after all, just distinguished them from other things, i.e.from things that are not clouds or sub-atomic particles. Indeed, <strong>Aristotle</strong> willargue that a thing, unless it is radically indeterminate, differs and can bedistinguished from other things above all because it is the determinate andwell-defined thing that it is—because it has an essence—or because it