Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

20 ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICSrelatively continuous work. Similar points can be established, on primarilytextual grounds, with regard to some of the other books. But we may setthis aside here. For we will largely concentrate on the above four sets ofbooks: I, III, IV; VII–IX; XII; and XIII–XIV. However, we will considerbooks XIII–XIV only to the extent that they bear on <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s criticism ofPlato’s theory of forms.But let us turn now to the question of thematic unity, i.e. the unity of asingle unified project. If we concentrate on these four sets of books in theMetaphysics (I, III, IV; VII–IX; XII; and XIII–XIV), we may naturally askto what extent there is a single theme that runs through them all. Certainlythere is a single theme that connects the first set (I, III and IV) and thesecond set (VII–IX). This is, precisely, the question, ‘What is being (toon)?’ and in particular ‘What is being qua being?’, i.e. ‘What is it for a beingto be a being?’ This question is expressly raised at the opening of book IV.But it is immediately (in IV. 2) associated with the question, ‘What isprimary being (prōtē ousia, often simply ousia)?’And book VII immediatelytakes up and, together with books VIII and IX, answers this centralquestion, ‘What is primary being?’So there is a single continuous theme that connects the first set (I, IIIand IV) and the second set (VII–IX), and this theme is provided by thebasic question of metaphysics, ‘What is being?’, and by the view that thisquestion must be addressed by addressing the question, ‘What is primarybeing?’ Whether this theme also extends to book XII is less clear. For itmay appear that book XII is not so much concerned with the question, (1)‘What is it for a being to be a being?’ It is rather concerned with thequestion, (2) ‘Why are there the kinds of beings that there are?’, and inparticular, ‘Why are there beings that are changing and material, butwhose change is intelligible and subject to explanation?’ However, it isarguable that book XII addresses not only question 2 but also question 1.In that case, book XII is after all also concerned with the basic question ofmetaphysics (see Chapter 8§11).But it appears that this thematic unity, which is provided by thequestions, ‘What is being?’ and ‘What is primary being?’, also extends to<strong>Aristotle</strong>’s criticism of Plato’s theory of forms, especially but not only inbooks XIII–XIV. For it will emerge that <strong>Aristotle</strong> sees Plato and himself asengaged in a shared project, the project of searching for primary being(ousia). And he thinks that he shares with Plato the general notion ofprimary being (see Chapters 7§4 and Chapter 9). Indeed, when <strong>Aristotle</strong>criticises Plato’s theory of forms, he does so against the background ofthinking that he and Plato are engaged in this shared project—the searchfor primary being. In general, the criticism is that while Plato asked the