Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

166 PHENOMENALISM AND RELATIVISMsuch a way that phainomena are ways in which things appear to us, on thebasis of sense perception, to be. So phainomena, as he uses the term here,involve predicative or judgemental thought, i.e. thought of the form:‘perhaps what I am sensing is thus and so’. For only if he uses the term inthis predication-involving or judgement-involving way can he assume, as heevidently does, that phainomena are true or false (or even merely: true orfalse relative to the one who has them). This is because the content of ourmental states can be true or false only if this content involves a predicativeor judgemental structure, i.e. a structure of the form: ‘things are thus andso’ or ‘things are not thus and so’.3The aim of considering phenomenalism and relativism<strong>Aristotle</strong> intends the examination of phenomenalism and relativism tocontribute directly to the defence of PNC. For when (at the end of IV. 6)he concludes and summarizes the overall defence of PNC, he presents thisconclusion as being at the same time the conclusion of his examination ofphenomenalism and relativism. He summarizes the overall defence of PNCas follows:Let this, then, suffice to show [A] that the claim that contradictorystatements cannot at once be true [i.e. PNC] is the most secure[bebaion] of all claims; and [B] what consequences are incurred bythose who deny this claim; and [C] why those who deny it do so.(1011 b 13–15)(See Chapter 5§2 for these aims.) But the reference to [C] why those whodeny PNC do so concludes, precisely, the examination (in IV. 5–6) ofphenomenalism, relativism and their relation to the denial of PNC.Evidently <strong>Aristotle</strong> does not accept phenomenalism or relativism, and heoffers various objections to these views here (in IV. 5–6). So we may easilyform the impression that his aim is directly to argue against these views. Itemerges, however, that this is not really his aim; his aim is rather to tracethe source of the denial of PNC and especially PNC-M, and in this way todefend PNC and PNC-M against those who deny them. In his words, theaim is ‘to show…why those who deny this [i.e. PNC] do so’ (1011 b 13–15). For he will argue that the source of the denial of PNC and PNC-M,i.e. the best line of reasoning in support of the denial of PNC and PNC-M,is phenomenalism, relativism and certain other views that are themselvesthe sources of phenomenalism and relativism. (We will consider this