Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

42 THE ULTIMATE EXPLANATIONS OF ALL THINGSknowledge is knowledge more strictly (mallon) than non-explanatoryknowledge; this is because it is explanatory knowledge that enables us todistinguish things as they really are distinguished in themselves.iiThe nature and requirements of explanations<strong>Aristotle</strong>’s theory of the nature of explanation is rooted in Plato’s. In thedialogue Phaedo (95ef., a passage with which <strong>Aristotle</strong> was familiar) Platoconsiders the nature of explanation. He points out that he is first of allconcerned with explanations of phenomena in nature—phenomena thatinvolve change and changing things. Plato argues that an explanation mustsatisfy a number of requirements: (R1) it must be completely general, oruniversal; (R2) it must be uniform; and (R3) it must be complete orcapable of being completed. He argues further that (R4) purely materialistexplanations, explanations that are based simply in the materialconstituents of things (e.g. that a thing is made of flesh and bones), do notsatisfy these requirements; hence they are not, by themselves, adequateexplanations. Finally, in his famous theory of forms, he argues that (R5)explanations are based in the essence of things. But he argues that theessence of things are separate and distinct from changing things, the thingswith which we are directly familiar from sense perception. In the course ofthe Metaphysics, <strong>Aristotle</strong> will argue that Plato’s view of essences, i.e. theview which argues that essences are separate and distinct from changingthings, is fundamentally mistaken (see below, Chapter 9). But thisdisagreement takes place against the background of a shared conception ofexplanation and a shared view that explanations are based in the essence ofthings.Let us briefly review these requirements for explanation.R1.GENERALITYIf we want to explain a particular thing, e.g. why this particular plantgrows in a certain way, the explanation must appeal to something aboutplants in general, not just this plant.R2. UNIFORMITYIf we explain a particular thing in a certain way, then we must explain inthe same way any other thing that is of the same kind. Conversely, if weexplain two particular things in the same way, then we must suppose thatthe two things are of the same kind. In short, this means: same