Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

THE ULTIMATE EXPLANATIONS OF ALL THINGS 53(1) THE ESSENCE OF A THING (TO TI ESTIN, TO TI ĒN EINAI)AND THE FORM OF A THING (HĒ MORPHĒ, TO EIDOS)This is now commonly referred to as ‘the formal cause’. In general, theessence of a thing is what the thing is in virtue of being the very thing it is;and the essence determines to what general kind the thing belongs. But<strong>Aristotle</strong> argues that the essence of a changing, material thing is its form(as opposed to its matter or to a combination of its form and its matter).By the form of a changing, material thing, such as, for instance, aparticular human being, he means that which explains why the matter (e.g.the flesh and bones) of this particular thing, the human being, constitutesthe thing that it constitutes: a particular human being. To take one of hisillustrative examples, the form of a particular bronze sphere is that whichexplains why the matter (the bronze) of this particular thing, the sphere,makes up this particular thing, a bronze sphere. So the form of a changing,material thing is an explanation and cause: it explains why the matter ofthat particular thing constitutes—or forms —that very thing. We shouldalso note that the form of a changing, material thing, just as the essence ofsuch a thing, is the same changeless form for as long as the thing exists; forexample, a particular human being has the same changeless form for aslong as he or she exists.(2) THE MATTER (HULĒ) OF A THINGThis is commonly referred to as ‘the material cause’. The matter of achanging, material thing, such as, for instance, a particular human being,is that which explains how the thing can change and especially how it canbe generated and come to be. In <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s standard terminology, thematter is ‘that out of which a thing comes to be’ (to ex hou gignetaihekaston). We can imagine matter as a certain material, e.g. bronze, in sofar as this material does not, or not yet, form any particular material thingof a certain form, e.g. a bronze sphere. And we can imagine the particularthing that is of a certain form, e.g. the bronze sphere, as the thing that isgenerated and comes to be out of this matter. But it is important to recognizethat <strong>Aristotle</strong> argues that matter cannot exist independently of particularmaterial things of a certain form. So it is not right to imagine that matteris simply a certain material, e.g. bronze; for this may suggest that mattercan exist independently of particular material things of a certain form: canexist simply as, for example, bronze that is not formed into any particularthing that is made of bronze. <strong>Aristotle</strong> emphasizes that matter cannot existon its own when he argues that matter is not a thing in its own right, but