13.07.2015 Views

Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

impossible. In particular, he argues that whether PNC is or is not true ofthings depends <strong>on</strong> whether things are determinate (hōrismena) orindeterminate (aorista). This, above all, is the questi<strong>on</strong> that divides<str<strong>on</strong>g>Aristotle</str<strong>on</strong>g> from those who deny PNC.<str<strong>on</strong>g>Aristotle</str<strong>on</strong>g> uses a variety of ways to indicate the c<strong>on</strong>trast between the twoviews—the view that things are determinate and the view that things areindeterminate. For example, he also describes the disputant’s view as beingthat things are not unitary (1007 b 26), whereas his own view is that thingsare unitary (1006 a 31–4, b 7–10); or as the view that things do not have anessence (1007 a 20–21), whereas his own view is that things have an essence(1006 a 32–34); or as the view that things are not definable, whereas hisown view is that things are definable (1012 a 21f.; in general a definiti<strong>on</strong> ofa thing is a true statement of its essence). So those who deny PNC thinkthat the truth of PNC stands and falls with the view that things aredeterminate, unitary, in possessi<strong>on</strong> of an essence and definable; but whatthey think is just that things are not like that.<str<strong>on</strong>g>Aristotle</str<strong>on</strong>g> agrees that the truth of PNC stands and falls with the view thatthings are determinate, unitary, in possessi<strong>on</strong> of an essence and definable.But he argues that the c<strong>on</strong>sequences of denying this view are unacceptable.For he argues that if things are not determinate, not unitary, not inpossessi<strong>on</strong> of an essence and not definable, then it is impossible to signify(sēmainein) things, i.e. to think and speak about things (1006 a 18- b 34). Healso thinks that this is evidently an unacceptable c<strong>on</strong>sequence; for heargues that to say something at all is to signify something, i.e. to think andspeak about something (1006 a 21–22).So <str<strong>on</strong>g>Aristotle</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s argument against those who deny PNC can besummarized as follows (1006 b 18–34):P1. PNC is not true of things if, and <strong>on</strong>ly if, things areindeterminate.P2. If things are indeterminate, then it is impossible to think andspeak about things.P3. It is possible to think and speak about things.Therefore,THE DEFENCE OF PNC 147C. It is not the case that PNC is not true of things; i.e. PNC is trueof things.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!