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Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

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CONCLUSIONWhat would we have to do in order to look for an overall assessment of<str<strong>on</strong>g>Aristotle</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <strong>Metaphysics</strong>?First, we would have to assess the basic questi<strong>on</strong> of metaphysics as<str<strong>on</strong>g>Aristotle</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>ceives it: the questi<strong>on</strong>, ‘What is being?’, i.e. ‘What is it forsomething, anything, to be a being?’ We recall that he thinks that when weraise this questi<strong>on</strong>, we raise it of beings with which we are already directlyfamiliar, pre-philosophically and from our ordinary experience. For beingsare directly apparent to us and present to us, they are all around us andmake up the world which we inhabit. So we would have to ask whether<str<strong>on</strong>g>Aristotle</str<strong>on</strong>g> does enough to motivate this basic questi<strong>on</strong> of metaphysics.Sec<strong>on</strong>d, we would have to assess <str<strong>on</strong>g>Aristotle</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s method of searching inmetaphysics, the method that is based in puzzlement and particular puzzles—aporia and aporiai—prompted by our thinking about being in general.Third, we would have to assess <str<strong>on</strong>g>Aristotle</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s central claim that we canaddress the questi<strong>on</strong>, ‘What is being?’, <strong>on</strong>ly by addressing the questi<strong>on</strong>,‘What is primary being?’ (prōtē ousia, often simply ousia). We recall that aprimary being is something that is a being simply in virtue of itself and notin virtue of its relati<strong>on</strong> to other things; and it is what explains what it is foranything to be a being. So we would have to ask whether, if we want tosearch for what being is, we must do so by searching for a privileged kindof being that explains what it is for anything to be a being.Fourth, we would have to assess the parameters within which <str<strong>on</strong>g>Aristotle</str<strong>on</strong>g>searches for an answer to the questi<strong>on</strong>: ‘What is primary being?’, i.e. theparameters set by what he c<strong>on</strong>siders to be the main candidates for primarybeing. These candidates were: the particular; the universal; and the essence(see VII. 3, 1028 b 33–36, discussed in Chapters 1§4 and 7§3). So wewould have to ask whether these are indeed the natural parameters.What if we follow <str<strong>on</strong>g>Aristotle</str<strong>on</strong>g> this far? Should we also follow him inanswering the questi<strong>on</strong>, ‘What is primary being?’, in the way in which heanswers it? His answer was that primary being with regard to each thing,

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