Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

248 THE SEARCH FOR PRIMARY BEINGAlternative interpretationOn our interpretation of <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s argument in VII. 13, he argues that nouniversal is a primary being. For primary being with regard to eachparticular thing (e.g. Socrates) is peculiar (idion) to that thing, ‘peculiar’ inthe sense that two distinct particulars (e.g. Socrates and Plato) do notstrictly share one and the same primary being; and they do not share thesame primary being even if they belong to the same kind or species (e.g.they are both human). But of course, no universal is in this sense peculiarto the particular of which it is true. On the contrary, it is part of what it isto be a universal that universals can be true of many things (e.g. manythings can be human). So no universal is a primary being.But there is a very different interpretation of <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s argument inVII. 13. This is of central importance. For we will see that it makes afundamental difference to the overall understanding of how, in book VII,<strong>Aristotle</strong> answers the question, ‘What is primary being?’, which of the twointerpretations we adopt. On the alternative interpretation, what <strong>Aristotle</strong>argues in VII. 13 is not that no universal is a primary being, but ratherthat to be a primary being is not simply to be a universal. What this meansis that not every universal is a primary being; but it allows that someuniversals, or some distinctive type of universals, are primary beings.Indeed, on this interpretation, <strong>Aristotle</strong> argues here (in VII. 13–16) that itis precisely a distinctive type of universals that are primary being withregard to each particular thing; namely, the species to which the particularbelongs. For example, primary being with regard to Socrates is beinghuman, where being human is the species to which Socrates belongs.Species-universals are peculiar (idia) to the particulars of which they aretrue, in the sense that they cannot be true of particulars that are differentin kind. For example, being human cannot be true of both Socrates andthe cock that, as his last wish, he asked to be sacrificed to Asclepius. Foralthough both Socrates and the cock are animals, they are different inkind, since Socrates is a human being and the cock is a bird. Indeed,species-universals appear to be the only universals that are peculiar (idia) inthis sense. For generic-universals, such as being an animal, can evidently betrue of things that belong to different kinds, e.g. Socrates and the cock. Thesame is obviously true of universals that do not signify kinds at all, such asbeing of a particular colour, e.g. orange; for example, both the rose and thegoldfish can be orange. So it is distinctive of species-universals to bepeculiar (idia) in this sense, i.e. they cannot be shared by particulars thatbelong to different kinds. But obviously such universals are not peculiar inthe sense that they cannot be shared by distinct particulars (e.g. Socrates