Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

176 PHENOMENALISM AND RELATIVISMargues that apparently we cannot know what the things themselves arereally like; but it assumes that the things themselves really are thus and soas opposed to not thus and so, and that we can think about and makeclaims about how the things themselves may really be. Phenomenalism, onthe other hand, argues that things are both thus and so and not thus andso; and relativism argues that it is impossible—in principle and not just forus—even to think about or make claims about how things may really be, itis only possible to think about and make claims about how things arerelative to us, our appearances and our conception of things.STEP 5So what must the defender of phenomenalism add to claims 2 and 3 inorder to generate precisely phenomenalism as opposed to scepticism?Evidently, they must add something that will serve to undermine the viewthat the truth is hidden from us or not evident to us (i.e. claim 4) —theview behind scepticism. They may naturally do so by defending thefollowing claim:7. Our sense perceptions and beliefs are only of things as theyappear to us and as we conceive them; they are not about thethings themselves.For example, if some wine appears sweet to one, and if one goes on on thisbasis to believe that the wine is sweet, then this belief is not (according toclaim 7) at all about the wine itself, it is only about the wine as it appearsto one and to one’s taste. This claim (i.e. 7) serves naturally to underminethe option of scepticism and the view that the truth is hidden from us ornot evident to us; for although the things themselves may be hidden fromus or not evident to us, it is not plausible to think that how things appearto our senses, or, in general, things as we conceive them, may be hiddenfrom us or not evident to us. On the contrary, if there is anything that isnot hidden from us and that is evident to us, it is how things appear to oursenses, and, in general, how we conceive things. So if we argue that what weperceive with our senses, and, in general, what we believe, is not the thingsthemselves, but only things as they appear to our senses, and, in general, aswe conceive them, then we may undermine the option of scepticism. (Theabove is an interpretation especially of <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s highly compressedargument in 1009 b 9–15.)But we must note an important presupposition of claim 7. For this claimpresupposes that: