Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

BEING QUA BEING AND PRIMARY BEING 119We will consider <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s general theory of primary being at lengthlater (in Chapter 7) and his theory of divine being, or God, later again (inChapter 8). The point here is that he characterizes metaphysics, on the onehand, as ontology (the theory of being in general and of all things), butalso, on the other hand, as ousiology (the theory of primary being, ousia)and ultimately as theology (the theory of divine being, God, which isprimary being most strictly). But there is no tension between <strong>Aristotle</strong>’sdifferent characterizations of metaphysics, and we do not have to choosebetween them or even to suppose that one of them is the central one. Onthe contrary, he thinks that all the characterizations are equally important.For he thinks that what we are searching for in metaphysics is what it is forsomething, anything, to be; so in this sense metaphysics is primarilyontology (about all things). But he also argues that what it is for things ingeneral to be depends on what it is for primary being to be, so in this sensemetaphysics is primarily ousiology (about primary being, ousia). But sincehe eventually argues that divine being and God are primary being moststrictly and absolutely, he concludes that ultimately metaphysics isprimarily theology (about divine being or God).At the end of book VI. 1, <strong>Aristotle</strong> directly addresses the question ofwhether metaphysics is about all being (ontology) or about God(theology):So if there is something that is everlasting, changeless and separate[i.e. God, it will emerge], evidently knowing this is the task of atheoretical science. However, this science is not physics (for physicsis about certain changing things), and not mathematics either [since<strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks that mathematics is not about separate things]; ratherit is prior to both physics and mathematics…. For the primaryscience [i.e. metaphysics] is about things that are both separate andchangeless [i.e. about God]…. There will, then, be three theoreticalphilosophies: mathematics, physics, and theology [theologikē]. For itis only natural that if what is divine is to be found anywhere, it is tobe found in this kind of thing [i.e. in things that are changeless andseparate], and that the most worthy science should be about themost worthy kind [i.e. the most worthy kind of being, namely,God].(1026 a 10–21)So here he appears to argue that metaphysics, or what he calls ‘primaryphilosophy’ (prōtē philosophia, 1026a24) and ‘primary science’ (prōtēepistēmē, 1026a29), is exclusively about divine being and God. But when