Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

250 THE SEARCH FOR PRIMARY BEINGdenies that they are primary beings. This makes room for the alternativeinterpretation. So, on the alternative interpretation, the phrase ‘the thingsthat are universally predicated’ serves to distinguish two types ofuniversals: those that are universally predicated and those that are notuniversally predicated. And <strong>Aristotle</strong>, on this interpretation, argues here (inVII. 13–16) that while the former type of universals cannot be primarybeings, the latter type of universals are, precisely, the primary beings.On this interpretation, <strong>Aristotle</strong> concludes that primary being withregard to each particular thing is the species to which the thing belongs;and the species is evidently a universal. But he also says that the species isnot universally predicated of the particulars that belong to it. For example,being human is not universally predicated of Socrates. What does thismean? According to this interpretation, the point of saying that, for example,being human is not universally predicated of Socrates is to draw attentionto the fact that the predication relation is a relation between two things—one thing being true of another. But the relation between Socrates andbeing human is not a relation between two things; for Socrates is a thing atall only in virtue of being human. And this, on the present interpretation,is precisely what <strong>Aristotle</strong> means when he says that, for example, beinghuman is not universally predicated of Socrates. So the alternativeinterpretation can apparently be reconciled with the text after all.But let us stand back and consider how the two interpretations ingeneral compare with each other. For the choice between them makes adecisive difference to how we think that <strong>Aristotle</strong> answers the question,‘What is primary being?’ First of all, on our interpretation it emerges thatprimary being with regard to each particular thing is itself a particular, nota universal. (Or perhaps rather, primary being with regard to eachparticular thing is primarily a particular and only as a consequence a kindor species, which is a universal. For this point, see §5ix of this chapter.) Onthe alternative interpretation, by contrast, primary being is, directly, a kindor species, which is a universal. This is a basic disagreement ofinterpretation about how <strong>Aristotle</strong> answers the aporia that he raised inbook III, the book of aporiai: Are principles one in kind or one in number?(see the ninth aporia, 999 b 24–1000 a 4). In other words, are there as manyprinciples as there are particular things, so that my principle and yours aredifferent even though we belong to the same kind and species, or are thereonly as many principles as there are kinds of things, so that my and yourprinciple are the same since we belong to the same kind and species? Onour interpretation, there are as many principles as there are particularthings (although we will see that these particular principles also generatekinds and species; see §5ix of this chapter). On the alternative