Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

126 THE DEFENCE OF PNC2<strong>Aristotle</strong>’s overall aim in considering PNCWhy, in general, does <strong>Aristotle</strong> consider PNC here (in IV. 3–6)? What is hisoverall aim? At the end of the investigation of PNC (i.e. at the end of IV.6), he gives a good summary of his main aims:Let this, then, suffice to show that [A] the claim that contradictorystatements cannot at once be true [i.e. PNC] is the most secure[bebaion] of all claims; and [B] what consequences are incurred bythose who deny this claim; and [C] why those who deny it do so.(1011 b 13–15)So the investigation of PNC has three main aims. First [A], <strong>Aristotle</strong> wantsto argue that PNC is ‘the most secure (or ‘firm’, bebaion) of all claims’. Hewill defend this view (in IV. 3) by arguing that the truth of PNC must bepresupposed in all reasoning and rational thought, or certainly in allrational thought that involves deductive reasoning (see later in thischapter, §3).Second [B], he wants to consider ‘what consequences are incurred bythose who deny this claim’, PNC. He will argue (especially in IV. 4) that ifone denies PNC, and in particular if one argues that PNC is not true ofthings, then one incurs the consequence that it is impossible to think andspeak about things.Third [C], he wants to consider ‘why those who deny it [PNC] do so’,i.e. to diagnose the source of the denial of PNC. His strategy here(especially in IV. 5–6) is to ask what is the best line of reasoning that onemay set out if one wants to deny PNC.It will emerge that the best line of reasoning in support of the denial ofPNC relies above all on the following views:(1) the things themselves are radically indeterminate.(2) Because the things themselves are radically indeterminate, PNC is nottrue of them.(3) Because PNC is not true of the things themselves, it is impossible tothink or speak of the things themselves.(4) But it is nevertheless possible for us to think and speak of things, eventhough it is impossible to think or speak of the things themselves; forwe can still think and speak of things as they appear to us and as weconceive them.