Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

310 CRITICISM OF PLATO’S THEORY OF FORMSdistinct forms leads to absurd consequences even on its own merit andindependently of his, <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s, alternative theory of essence. But beforewe look closer at <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s criticism of Plato’s theory, let us consider howhe understands what appears to be the basic motivation behind thistheory, i.e. the view that sense-perceptible and in general changing thingsdo not have an essence and do not have any determinate features in virtueof themselves.3<strong>Aristotle</strong>’s diagnosis of the source of Plato’s theory ofessences as separate formsIn a central and especially interesting passage, in which <strong>Aristotle</strong> wants firstof all to understand why Plato and the Platonists hold the theory ofessences as separate forms, he gives the following diagnosis of the source ofthis theory:Those who believe in the forms [eidē] came to this belief becausethey became convinced of the truth of the Heracleitean view that allsense-perceptible things [ta aisthēta] are always flowing. So [theyconcluded] that if there is to be explanatory knowledge [epistēmē]and wisdom [phronēsis] about anything, there must be certain othernatures, besides [para] the ones that can be perceived through thesenses, which are enduring [i.e. not flowing and changing]. For [theyclaimed] that there is no explanatory knowledge of flowing things.Now Socrates had been concerned with ethical virtues and had beenthe first to search for universal definitions about these…. ButSocrates was justified in searching for what something is [to ti estin,the essence]; for he was seeking to reason deductively, and thestarting-point [archē] of deductive reasoning is the essence [to ti estin]…. For there are just two things that one might fairly ascribe toSocrates, namely, inductive arguments and giving universaldefinitions, both of which are concerned with the starting-point[archē] of explanatory knowledge. But Socrates did not makeuniversals or definitions separate; the Platonists, on the other hand,did make them separate, and such beings [i.e. separate beings] theycalled ‘ideas’ (ideai, also eidē, ‘forms’).(XIII. 4, 1078 b 12–32; see also XIII. 9, 1086 a 32– b 13 and I. 6,987 a 29– b 10)