Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

200 THE SEARCH FOR PRIMARY BEING4Primary being and separation (ontologicalindependence) (VII. 1)Early in book VII <strong>Aristotle</strong> says that primary being is separate being(chōriston, ‘separate’):For none of the other things that are said [i.e. the non-primarybeings] are separate; but primary being [ousia] alone is separate.(VII. 1,1028 a 33–34)(See also XII. 1, 1069 a 24–30 for this same claim, and for the view thatmany and various philosophers have, both now and in the past, committedthemselves to it.) So the claim is that primary being is separate being,whereas non-primary being is not separate being. This claim is evidentlyalso about <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s preferred candidates for primary being, i.e. the essenceand the ultimate subject of predication (we will return to this point below,in §5iv of this chapter). But it is above all about primary being in generaland the very notion of primary being, hence about any candidate forprimary being. So he thinks that any philosopher that raises the question,‘What is primary being?’, will naturally think of primary being as separatebeing, i.e. separate from non-primary being; for to think of primary beingas separate being is part of the very notion of primary being.But what does <strong>Aristotle</strong> mean by ‘separate’ (chōriston) when he says thatprimary being is separate being? This claim means, apparently, thatprimary being is independent of non-primary being, whereas non-primarybeing is dependent on primary being. We may also refer to this claim asthe claim that primary being is ontologically independent of non-primarybeing, whereas non-primary being is ontologically dependent on primarybeing. For it is natural to use the term ‘ontology’ for the theory of what itis for something, anything, to be; and we will see that the claim thatprimary being is separate being is a central ontological claim. But whatkind of dependence and independence does <strong>Aristotle</strong> have in mind?Apparently, he has in mind a very particular kind of explanatoryindependence and dependence. For the claim that primary being isseparate being is about the very notion of primary being. But this notion is,precisely, the notion: that which ultimately explains what it is forsomething, anything, to be; and which does so by directly explaining whatit is for itself (i.e. for primary being) to be and indirectly explaining alsowhat it is for anything else (i.e. for non-primary being) to be. (See §1 ofthis chapter for this point, also Chapter 4§§1–3.) In general, primary