Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

However, <strong>Aristotle</strong> also thinks that there are philosophers who denyPNC and do so without arguing fallaciously. In other words, they defendviews that they think imply the falsity of PNC, and he agrees that theirviews do indeed have this implication. As we will see, it is the followingview in particular which both those who deny PNC and <strong>Aristotle</strong> thinkdirectly implies the falsity of PNC:Things are radically indeterminate (aorista).THE DEFENCE OF PNC 139So both according to those who deny PNC and according to <strong>Aristotle</strong>, ifthings are radically indeterminate, then PNC will not be true of things —and in this sense PNC will be false. The difference between <strong>Aristotle</strong> andthose who deny PNC, therefore, is over whether things really are radicallyindeterminate. Those who deny PNC think so, but <strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks not—he argues, on the contrary, that things are determinate (hōrismena). So thetask that <strong>Aristotle</strong> sets himself is to argue against those who think thatthings are radically indeterminate, and so to defend PNC against thosewho want to deny it.We will later consider this fundamental dispute between <strong>Aristotle</strong> andthose who in this way deny PNC (see §§7–9 of this chapter, and alsoChapter 6). But let us begin by considering how in general he understandsthose who in this way deny PNC. As he sees them, they claim not only thatit is possible that there are things that are both F and not-F. Rather, theyclaim that there actually are things that are both F and not-F; and they areready to give examples of such things (see 1006 b 33–34). Even moreradically, they claim that all things are both F and not-F:The same view [i.e. that all things are both F and not-F] is also thesource of Protagoras’ view…. For if [as Protagoras thinks] all beliefsand appearances are true, it is necessary that everything should be atonce true and false.(IV. 5, 1009 a 6–9)Heracleitus’ view, which says that all things are and are not [i.e. are Fand are not-F], makes everything true.(IV. 7, 1012 a 24–26)It appears that <strong>Aristotle</strong> clearly distinguishes between the view that somethings are both F and not-F and the view that all things are both F andnot-F (see 1008 a 7–12). So he must be thinking deliberately that those who