Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

THE ULTIMATE CAUSE OF CHANGE: GOD 279outermost heaven. Perhaps this will appear too incredible to us. How, wemay ask, can something cause something else to move without acting onit? But if we find this objection compelling, it is perhaps because wesuppose that the function of the ultimate cause of change is to change thestate of motion of the outermost heaven. For surely it would be right forus to cbject that something cannot cause something else to change its stateof motion, unless it acts on it. But if we bear in mind that the function ofthe ultimate cause of change is not to change the state of motion of theoutermost heaven in any way, since the outermost heaven always was inmotion and in the same state of motion, perhaps we will be more ready toenvisage that the ultimate cause of change may cause the outermost heavento move in the way it does, but without acting on or interacting with it.The ultimate cause of change simply does not need to interact with theoutermost heaven, for there is no question of its interacting with theheaven and so causing it to change its state of motion.The reason why the kind of causation distinctive of the ultimate causeof change does not depend on interaction with the outermost heaven isquite simply that the ultimate cause of change is changeless, so it movesother things without itself moving or changing (1072 a 26–27). Forsomething can interact with something else only if it itself changes ormoves; and this is so for the simple reason that interacting is itself a form ofchanging or moving. So there is, apparently, adequate harmony betweencause and effect in <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s conception of the causation between theultimate cause of change and the outermost heaven. On the one hand, theultimate cause of change cannot interact with the outermost heaven; forthe ultimate cause of change is changeless, and interaction is a kind ofmotion and change. On the other hand, the outermost heaven does notrequire interaction from the ultimate cause of change; for the outermostheaven does not change its state of motion, and interaction would only berequired if it did change its state of motion. So it appears that <strong>Aristotle</strong>’saccount of the causation distinctive of the ultimate cause of change,whether or not it is ultimately convincing, is at least coherent on a centralpoint.But how can the ultimate cause of change cause the distinctive motionof the outermost heaven without itself moving or changing, and withoutinteracting with the heaven? As an answer to this central question,<strong>Aristotle</strong> appeals to a familiar context in which the cause of motion andchange need not itself move or change, and certainly its causation does notdepend on its moving or changing: