Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

216 THE SEARCH FOR PRIMARY BEINGmeant by ‘definition’: a definition is an account of ‘what precisely’ (hoper)something is, i.e. what it is ‘in virtue of itself’ (kath’ hauto). For example,even if water is a particular kind of liquid, this is not what precisely wateris and what it is in virtue of itself; hence ‘a particular kind of liquid’ is notthe definition of water. For water’s being a particular kind of liquiddepends on other things and in general on those circumstances thatdetermine in what state the water is in. If anything, the definition ofwater, as we now know, is H 2 O, and this is what precisely water is andwhat it is in virtue of itself, and not in virtue of its relation to other things.Evidently, <strong>Aristotle</strong> is assuming here that it is possible to define things,not just words, and that, with regard to each thing, there is indeedprecisely something that it is and that it is in virtue of itself. He isassuming that things have essences. So the kind of definitions that he hasin mind are real, not nominal definitions: definitions of things, not words.However, even if we are satisfied with this general characterization ofthe concept of essence, there is a striking problem about how to apply it toparticular cases. This is a problem that <strong>Aristotle</strong> recognizes and tries toanswer here (in VII. 4–5). The problem is whether each thing has just asingle essence or, on the contrary, indefinitely many essences. This is aproblem, especially if one argues, as <strong>Aristotle</strong> does, that changing, materialthings (e.g. Socrates) have an essence. For a changing, material thing hasindefinitely many properties and indefinitely many things are true of it. Sowhy should just one of its properties have a decisive claim to being itsessence, i.e. the very thing that the thing is?It is worth emphasizing here <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s view that changing, materialthings have an essence. Indeed, he thinks that, primarily and above all, it ischanging, material things, when conceived as ultimate subjects ofpredication, that have an essence. Thus he will argue that primary beingwith regard to each changing, material thing is both the essence and theform of that thing, on the one hand, and the ultimate subject ofpredication with regard to that thing, on the other hand. For he will arguethat the essence and the form of a changing, material thing is, precisely,the ultimate subject of predication with regard to that thing (see §5v inthis chapter).But each changing, material thing (e.g. Socrates) has many properties,indeed indefinitely many. So why does it not have just as many essences,depending on which of its properties we have in mind when we ask, ‘Whatis its essence?’? For example, Socrates is a human being, but he is also snubnosed,pale, five foot tall, the mentor of Plato, etc. So we may ask, ‘Whatis the essence of this human being, Socrates?’, or ‘What is the essence ofthis snub-nosed thing, Socrates?’, etc. And each question will apparently