Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

244 THE SEARCH FOR PRIMARY BEINGuniversal that is true of a particular thing, whether it is true of itaccidentally, e.g. being snub-nosed with regard to Socrates, or essentially,e.g. being human with regard to Socrates, is primary being with regard tothat thing. (But see below, for a very different interpretation of <strong>Aristotle</strong>’sclaim here. For, on a very different interpretation, he is only arguing forthe claim that not all universals are primary being, and not for the claimthat no universal is primary being. We will first set out our interpretation,and then consider the alternative interpretation.)It is worth emphasizing that when <strong>Aristotle</strong> argues here (in VII. 13) thatprimary being with regard to a particular thing is not the universals thatare true of that thing, and that no universal is a primary being, he is relyingon his own view of what primary being is. In particular, he is relying onthe view, which he has defended so far in the course of book VII, that theessence and the form, on the one hand, and the ultimate subject ofpredication, on the other hand, are strictly one and the same thing; andthey are both equally primary being. Evidently the ultimate subject ofpredication is not a universal. So if the ultimate subject of predication isstrictly the same thing as the essence and the form, and if both are equallyprimary being, then evidently primary being is not a universal at all, andno universal is a primary being. It is, therefore, no coincidence that theargument for the claim that no universal is a primary being comes onlytowards the end of book VII.The claim that no universal is a primary being is clearly a mostimportant claim. <strong>Aristotle</strong> argued earlier (in VII. 3) that primary being isnot simply the ultimate subject of predication. But now (in VII. 13) heargues that primary being is not what is predicated of the ultimate subjecteither, if what is predicated is a universal. So evidently he wants to avoidthe dilemma: either primary being is simply the ultimate subject ofpredication or it is a universal predicated of and true of this subject. But itappears particularly difficult to avoid this dilemma. (See §3 of this chapter,for the see-saw between the view that primary being is simply the ultimatesubject of predication and the view that primary being is the universalsthat are predicated of and true of this subject.) So it is especially importantthat this is what <strong>Aristotle</strong> wants to do. We should also recall the basicattraction of the view that primary being with regard to a particular thing,e.g. Socrates, is the universals that determine what that thing is or is like.For it appears to be precisely the universals that are true of a particularthing, or at least some of them, that explain why this thing is a determinateand well-defined thing at all. Indeed, in virtue of itself and setting aside theuniversals that are true of it, a particular thing, e.g. Socrates, appears to be