Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

PHENOMENALISM AND RELATIVISM 1731. PNC is not true of anything if, and only if, all appearances andall beliefs are true.Here the radical denial of PNC is the claim that any thing is at once thusand so (i.e. F) and not thus and so (i.e. not-F), and that this is so withregard to any property or quality F. (See 1009 a 11–12. He also states theradical denial of PNC by saying that all things are at once true and false;see 1009 a 9. For if it is true that a thing is F, it is also false that it is F, sinceit is at once not-F; and if it is true that a thing is not-F, then it is also falsethat it is not-F, since it is at once F.) The argument for this claim (i.e.claim 1) is relatively straightforward (see 1009 a 8–16). Suppose, on the onehand (1009 a 8–12), that all appearances and all beliefs are true, i.e. supposephenomenalism. Since people generally contradict each other and holdcontrary beliefs, contradictory beliefs will at once be true. So PNC will befalse. (Strictly, to obtain the result that PNC will not be true of anything, weneed to add that people can have beliefs, and indeed contradictory beliefs,about anything.) Suppose, on the other hand (1009 a 12–15), that any thingis at once thus and so (i.e. F) and not thus and so (i.e. not-F), and that thisis so with regard to any quality F, i.e. suppose the radical denial of PNC.Then the belief that a thing is F will be true (since the thing is F) andlikewise the belief that a thing is not-F will be true (since the thing is atonce not-F). So contradictory beliefs will at once be true. But if wesuppose, further, that to believe something about something is either tobelieve that it is thus and so (i.e. F) or to believe that it is not thus and so(i.e. not-F), then we may conclude that all beliefs will at once be true. So,in general, phenomenalism is the source of the radical denial of PNC, andthe two views stand and fall together (i.e. claim 1 is true).STEP 2<strong>Aristotle</strong>’s next step is to ask: what is the source of phenomenalism itself,i.e. what is the best line of reasoning that a defender of phenomenalism canset out in support of their position? (see 1009 a 38- b 2) Since they have justargued that phenomenalism stands and falls with the radical denial ofPNC, the quest for the source of phenomenalism is at the same time aquest for the source of the radical denial of PNC. It emerges that the line ofreasoning in support of phenomenalism involves considerable complexityand needs to be traced with particular care (see 1009 b 2–1010 a 15). First,part of the source of phenomenalism is, apparently, the observation thatthere is conflict among the sense perceptions of different people—andindeed of the same person at different times, or the same person at the same