Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

258 THE SEARCH FOR PRIMARY BEINGsays that the form of each changing, material thing, which he argues is theessence of that thing, is the same in kind (homoeidēs) in different particularmaterial things, e.g. in different particular human beings such as Socratesand Plato. He finds manifest confirmation of this view in the fact that onehuman being begets another human being, i.e. another particular materialthing of the same kind (VII. 7, 1032 a 24–25). The kind of solution that hehas in mind is clearly stated in book XII:It is the particular that is the principle of the particulars; for whilehuman being is the principle of human being universally, there is nouniversal human being, but Peleus is the principle of Achilles, andyour father of you [etc.].(XII. 5, 1071 a 20–22)But the solution is indicated even more clearly at the end of book XIII —the only passage in the Metaphysics in which he appears explicitly toformulate a solution:For there can be no demonstration of the fact that this particulartriangle is the sum of two right angles, unless [there is therebydemonstration of the fact that] every triangle is the sum of two rightangles; nor can there be demonstration of the fact that this particularhuman being is an animal, unless [there is thereby demonstration ofthe fact that] every human being is an animal.(XIII. 10, 1086 b 34–37)The kind of demonstration that he has in mind here is scientificdemonstration—demonstration which is based on definitions of theessence of things.So what is <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s solution to the problem that, on the one hand,that which primarily and fundamentally exists, i.e. primary being, isparticulars, but, on the other hand, explanatory knowledge is knowledge ofuniversals? The solution is to be found in the overall view that emergesfrom book VII, i.e. the view that the essence and the form of a particularmaterial thing is primarily a particular, but also, as a consequence, a universal(see §5ix of this chapter). The essence and the form is a particular because,first, it is identical with the particular material thing whose essence andform it is; and, second, it explains something about the particular materialthing in so far as this particular material thing is the very particular it is,e.g. Socrates (as opposed to, for example, Plato). But, as a consequence,the essence and the form is also a universal in the sense that it explains