Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

322 CRITICISM OF PLATO’S THEORY OF FORMSof <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s theory of essence; it may have its own internal problems.Indeed, we will see that when he uses his theory of essence to criticizePlato’s theory, this also alerts us to problems in his theory. And this is asalutary correction of the impression that his theory of essence is nothingbut a natural consequence of his criticism of Plato’s theory. So we mayrather conclude that the two theories, i.e. Plato’s assertion of separationand distinctness and <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s denial of separation and distinctness, arereally on the same level. This means that, intuitively and pre-theoretically,there is no more reason to think that essences are not separate and distinctfrom changing things than there is to think that they are separate anddistinct from changing things.It is also important to recognize, as we saw, that <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s theory ofessence is decidedly under-characterized, if we characterize it simply as theview that essences are not separate and distinct from changing things—simply as the view that essences are, as we might say, immanent. For anumber of very different views about the relation between a changingthing and its essence are compatible with thinking that changing thingshave essences and that essences are not separate and distinct from changingthings (see §4 of this chapter). <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s distinctive view is that therelation between a changing thing and its essence is a relation between thechanging thing and itself; for he argues that a changing thing, in the sensein which a changing thing is a particular and an ultimate subject ofpredication, is identical with its essence (see Chapter 7§5v). This showsquite clearly that <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s theory of essence is not simply a naturalconsequence of his rejection of Plato’s theory.<strong>Aristotle</strong>’s external criticism of Plato’s theory of essences as separateforms is based on two central Aristotelian claims about essence:A. Those things that in the strict sense have an essence, i.e. theprimary beings, are identical with their essence; andB. The essence of a thing that in the strict sense has an essence, i.e.of a primary being, is an ultimate subject of predication.We have considered these claims previously (see Chapter 7§5v). Our aimhere is to consider how these claims entail, against Plato, that essences arenot separate and distinct from changing things.Claim A is compatible with Plato’s view that essences are separate anddistinct from changing things. Indeed, Plato himself appears to hold thisclaim; for he appears to think, exactly, that separate and distinct forms,which are for him the only things that have an essence, are identical withtheir essence. Certainly <strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks that Plato and the Platonists are