Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

330 CRITICISM OF PLATO’S THEORY OF FORMSthere is not just one form in each case, for example, just one form of largethings or just one form of human things, but infinitely many.To see why this is so, let us take as our initial set of, for example, humanthings (or large things), two sense-perceptible, changing things that arehuman—Smith and Jones. Then (according to the one-over-manyassumption, OM), there will be one form, H, of things that are human,such that each of the members of this set, Smith and Jones, is human invirtue of its relation to this form, H. But (according to the distinctnessassumption, DI) this form, H, will not be one of the things in the originalset of human things: Smith and Jones. So the form H will be a third thing,besides and distinct from Smith and Jones. But (according to the selfpredicationassumption, SP) the form H is itself a thing that is human. Butnow this means that there is a new set of things that are human: Smith,Jones and the form H. And (again according to the one-over-manyassumption, OM) there will be a form, H1, of things that are human, suchthat each of the members of this set, Smith, Jones and H, is human invirtue of its relation to this form, H1. And (again according to thedistinctness assumption, DI) this form, H1, will not be one of the things inthe previous set of human things: Smith, Jones and H. So the form H1will be a fourth thing, besides and distinct from Smith, Jones and H. Andso on without end. So, on these assumptions, there will be not one form ofthings that are human (or large, or any other kind), but infinitely manyforms. But this is to reduce the theory of forms to absurdity.This, then, is how the third-man or third-large argument must work inorder to be successful against the theory of forms. But is it successful? Thisevidently depends on whether those who hold the theory of forms, and Platoin particular, accept the above premises or assumptions: the one-overmanyassumption (OM); the self-predication assumption (SP); and thedistinctness assumption (DI). Plato appears to think that he is notvulnerable to the third-large argument; for he does not give up the theoryof forms even after he developed this argument against it. So we maysuppose that he rejects one of the assumptions of the argument.Indeed, it is evident that Plato rejects the distinctness assumption (DI).He accepts this assumption with regard to sense-perceptible, changingthings; for he thinks that sense-perceptible, changing things are notdeterminate (hence are not F, where F is some determination or property)in virtue of themselves, but are determinate in virtue of their relation tosomething that is separate and distinct from them, i.e. the changeless formF. But he rejects this assumption with regard to changeless forms; for hethinks that a changeless form F is, exactly, F in virtue of itself and not invirtue of its relation to another form. For example, in the dialogue the