Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

106 BEING QUA BEING AND PRIMARY BEINGonly if, it is a being that ‘refers to’ and ‘depends on’ a primary being, i.e. itis a being in virtue of its relation to a primary being.The focal structure of being implies that although being is said inseveral ways, depending on what is said to be, this does not render theword ‘to be’ simply ambiguous (‘homonymous’). For example, we may saythat bank is said in several ways, depending on whether what is called abank is a river bank or a financial bank. But this only means that the word‘bank’ is ambiguous, and there is no reason why we should use the sameword, ‘bank’, in the two cases. But because the different ways in whichsomething can be said to be ultimately depend on a single way and a singlekind of being, the word ‘to be’ is not simply ambiguous. (However, wemust also recall that <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s point is not ultimately about the word ‘tobe’, but about what it is for something to be. We will return to this pointin a moment.)How in general does <strong>Aristotle</strong> determine whether, when two differentthings are said to be F, F is said in the same way or in different ways ofeach thing? He provides a general criterion at the opening of theCategories: if two different things are both said to be F, then F is said in thesame way of both things if, and only if, the account or definition (logos) ofwhat it is to be F applies (and applies in the same way) to both things. Forexample, if a cat and a dog are both said to be animals, animal is said inthe same way of both; for the definition of what it is to be an animalapplies (and applies in the same way) to both cats and dogs. At theopposite extreme, if a river bank and a financial bank are both said to bebanks, bank is not said in the same way of these two things; for there is nosingle definition of what it is to be a bank that applies to both these things.As it stands, however, this criterion does not determine whether, if F issaid in two different ways of two things, these ways are entirely unrelated,in which case we are dealing with simple ambiguity (as in the meaning of‘bank’), or they are somehow related, perhaps by one way being the centralor focal way and the other way being dependent on it (as in the meaningof ‘being’). To distinguish a case of simple ambiguity from a case wherethere are different but related meanings, we need to distinguish two cases:(1) a single definition of F does not in any way apply to both things; and(2) a single definition of F applies to both things, but in different ways.In the first case we have simple ambiguity, but in the second case we havedifferent but related ways of saying something, F, of something (we maycall this ‘complex ambiguity’). Both cases contrast with the case in which