Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

280 THE ULTIMATE CAUSE OF CHANGE: GODThere is something [namely, the ultimate cause of change] which,without [itself] changing, moves [other things]…. But this is howwhat is desired [to orekton] and what is thought by the intellect [tonoēton] moves [i.e. moves other things], namely, it moves [otherthings] without [itself] moving.(XII. 7, 1072 a 26–27)Here we are asked to remind ourselves of how intelligent animals arecaused to move and act, in particular animals that are capable of desire(orexis, cf. to orekton, the object of desire), especially rational desire(boulēsis, cf. boulēton 1072 a 28), and of rational thought (noēsis, cf. tonoēton, the object of rational thought). Such animals, we are asked torecall, are directly moved by their own rational thought and desire, whenthey deliberate and come to recognize that something is good and worthpursuing. But ultimately what moves them is the object that theyrecognize is good and worth pursuing (the orekton/boulēton and noēton).As <strong>Aristotle</strong> points out here: ‘reason [nous] is moved by the object that isrationally thought of [to noēton]’ (1072 a 30). But while the thought anddesire of an animal changes when the animal moves as a result of itsthought and desire, the object of the thought and desire, i.e. what isrecognized as good and worth pursuing, need not change, and it does notdepend for its causation on its changing. For example, if I reason that acertain kind of exercise is necessary in order to secure health, which Irecognize to be a good thing and worth pursuing, then (supposing that Iam sufficiently rational) my desires will change and they will cause me tochange. But the object that I recognize to be good and worth pursuing,health, does not change, and it does not need to change in order to causeme to pursue it. <strong>Aristotle</strong> makes the same point more fully elsewhere:It is always the object of desire which produces motion, but this iseither the good or the apparent good; and not every good but thegood that can be achieved by action…. That which produces motionis twofold: that which is changeless, and that which produces motionand itself changes. That which is changeless is the good to beachieved by action, and that which produces motion and itselfchanges is the faculty of desire.(De Anima, 3.10, 433 a 27– b 17)So it emerges that the ultimate cause of change is supposed to move theoutermost heaven by virtue of the fact that the ultimate cause of change is