Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICS 11distinction between being in general and primary being. Summarily, theanswer to the aporia is this. Suppose that we cannot conceive of being, ingeneral and as a whole, either by distinguishing it from something outsideit or by distinguishing it from what is inside it. Perhaps we can stillconceive of being, if we suppose that there is a distinction between thingsthat are beings simply in virtue of themselves (i.e. primary beings) andthings that are beings in virtue of their relation to those things (i.e. nonprimarybeings). For then we can conceive of being, in the following way:by supposing that anything that is, i.e. any being, is a being either simply invirtue of itself and not in virtue of its relation to other things (in whichcase it is a primary being) or in virtue of its relation to a primary being (inwhich case it is a non-primary being).This way of introducing the notion, primary being, also shows what<strong>Aristotle</strong> means by primary being and how he distinguishes betweenprimary beings and non-primary beings. For something to be a primarybeing is for it to be a being, something that is, simply in virtue of itself(kath’ hauto) and not in virtue of its relation to other things; whereas forsomething to be a non-primary being is for it to be a being only in virtue ofits relation to other things, namely, a primary being. (See Chapters 4§3and 7§4 for a fuller account of the general notion, primary being.)But it is important to recognize that this general notion, primary being,is not yet <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s answer to the question, ‘What is primary being?’ Onthe contrary, it will emerge that he thinks that this question, ‘What isprimary being?’, is one that he shares with other thinkers that have raisedthe basic question of metaphysics, ‘What is being?’ But he thinks thatdifferent thinkers have defended very different answers to just thisquestion, ‘What is primary being?’ For example, materialists argue that it isabove all the basic material elements of physical bodies, such as theelements fire, water and earth, that are primary beings (see VII. 2,1028 b 8f.). But Plato and the Platonists argue that what is primary beingabove all is certain eternal beings that are distinct from (para) the senseperceptibleand physical things; i.e. they argue that the forms (eidē) are theprimary beings (see VII. 2, 1028 b 18f.). So <strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks that just as heshares the basic question, ‘What is being?’, with other thinkers, so thequestion, ‘What is primary being?’, is a shared one (see Chapter 7§1).<strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks that the question, ‘What is primary being?’, is commonto very different thinkers, and that very different answers can be defendedin response to it. This has one immediate and very importantconsequence: it is wrong to translate ousia as ‘substance’, or prōtē ousia as‘primary substance’. The terms ousia and prōtē ousia in <strong>Aristotle</strong> areusually translated as ‘substance’ and ‘primary substance’ (at least by