Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

ARISTOTLE’S METHOD IN METAPHYSICS 87at once. In other words, my principle is my essence, and this is differentfrom your essence (although we are both human and belong to the samegeneral kind); but my essence and your essence, although different innumber, are one in kind (since we belong to the same kind). However, ona different interpretation of his solution to this central aporia, his view israther that principles are only one in kind, not one in number: myprinciple is my essence, and this is simply the same as yours (since webelong to the same general kind). We will take up this aporia at lengthbelow, in Chapter 7, especially §5viii–ix.Tenth Aporia (1000 a 5–1001 a 3)Are the principles of perishable and imperishable things the same or different?On <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s conception of nature and the physical universe, natureconsists of both perishable things, i.e. things that are subject to generationand destruction (e.g. plants and animals), and imperishable things, i.e.eternal things, things not subject to generation and destruction (e.g. theplanets and the stars, as he conceives them). The question is whether thereis a single explanation to account for both of these kinds of things together,and so to account for the unity of nature. We will consider the answer tothis aporia below, in Chapter 8.Eleventh Aporia (1001 a 4– b 25)Is primary being simply being itself and unity itself or is primary being ratherthings that are and are one?In other words, suppose that being and unity are primary beings—because they are that in virtue of which any being is a being, somethingthat is. Are they primary beings simply because they themselves are thatwhich primarily is, or are they primary beings only because some otherthing (e.g. this rose) is and is a unified thing? We may wonder how<strong>Aristotle</strong> answers this intriguing aporia. He will eventually argue thatprimary being with regard to each thing is the essence of that thing (seeChapter 7§5iv). For it is, he will argue, in virtue of having an essence thateach thing is a being, something that is, in the first place. So he appears todefend the latter side of the aporia: essences are primary beings becauseother things (e.g. this rose) are beings in virtue of having essences. But hewill also argue that it is precisely essences that are the primary beings. Sohe also appears to defend the former side: it is the essences themselves thatare primary beings. He must, apparently, think that the two sides can bothbe true. On a different interpretation, however, he only defends the latter