Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

CRITICISM OF PLATO’S THEORY OF FORMS 317Plato’s forms—which is the main target of his criticism. So the target ofthe criticism is the view that changing things and forms are things that aredistinct from one another. The notion of two things being distinct fromone another is familiar especially when applied to things in space. For suchthings are evidently distinct from one another if they occupy different andnon-overlapping places. But what in general is it for two things to bedistinct from one another? This question is pressing; for evidently Plato’sforms, if they are in general distinct from changing things, do not as suchoccupy a place in space. <strong>Aristotle</strong> does not provide a general account ofwhat it is for two things to be distinct from one another. But he appears tohave in mind the following: two things are distinct from one another if, andonly if:(1) they are not identical; and(2) they are not overlapping, i.e. they do not share any part.We saw earlier that separation in the sense of ontological independencedoes not entail separation in the sense of distinctness; and <strong>Aristotle</strong> doesnot think that there is such an entailment (see Chapter 7§4). So when hecharacterizes Plato’s essences and forms as separate things in the sense ofthings that are distinct from changing things, he is not simply drawing aconsequence from the characterization of them as separate in the sense ofontologically independent things, i.e. things that are beings simply invirtue of themselves. In particular, the characterization of Plato’s essences asontologically independent beings is simply part of <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s observationthat the forms are, in Plato’s view, the primary beings (hai ousiai). But theview that essences are distinct from changing things, <strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks, reliesrather on a complex argument, which is based on the claim that, whileessences are changeless, changing things are changing (see §3 of thischapter).So <strong>Aristotle</strong> characterizes Plato’s essences and forms as separate in twoways or senses:(1) they are ontologically independent beings, i.e. they are beings, thingsthat are, simply in virtue of themselves; and(2) they are distinct from changing things.Apparently, he also characterizes Plato’s essences as separate in a thirdsense, i.e. as (3) capable of existing even if they are not true of changingthings, i.e. even if they are not, as is sometimes said today,‘instantiated in’changing things. In other words, he apparently thinks that