Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

142 THE DEFENCE OF PNCdepends on something that is a determinate and well-defined thing andhas an essence.So, if this argument succeeds, it will establish not only that some thingsare determinate, but that all things are determinate. In other words, it willestablish that, with regard to each and every thing, x, there is at least oneproperty, F, such that x cannot be both F and not-F. This property, F, it willemerge, is the essence of x, i.e. that in virtue of which x is a determinate andwell-defined thing in the first place.Of course, there will still remain a problem. For <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s original aimwas to establish that all things, with regard to any property F, cannot beboth F and not-F. But if his argument succeeds, it will, in the first instanceat least, establish only that all things, with regard to some property F(namely, their essence), cannot be both F and not-F. We will return to thisproblem later (in §9 of this chapter).To us, <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s strategy may appear very puzzling. We tend to find ithard enough to imagine someone asserting that it is possible for somethingto be both F and not-F; let alone asserting that something is actually bothF and not-F; not to speak of asserting that all things are, for any propertyF, both F and not-F. So, to us, <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s familiarity with those who inthis way deny PNC, and his radical characterization of their denial, mayappear very puzzling. It is worth concentrating for a moment on how wetend to conceive of PNC, since this may indicate how, and how verydifferently, <strong>Aristotle</strong> conceives of PNC and of those who deny it.Incidentally, it is also worth emphasizing that there are notable exceptionsto this modern tendency. Graham Priest is an exception, for he finds it alltoo easy to imagine true contradictions, i.e. some true contradictions.Apparently, Priest is closer to <strong>Aristotle</strong> than to the modern tendency. Weshould also note that Priest is a clear exception to the following diagnosis ofthe modern tendency.We tend to conceive of PNC as the principle which says that nostatement can be both true and not true. And we tend to think that PNCis a logical principle, both in the sense that it is about statements and inthe sense that, if it is true, it is true because of the nature of statements.We also tend to think that PNC is a perfect candidate for a principlewhose truth is a priori and even analytical. We tend to think that PNC is apriori and analytical in the sense that its truth is independent of whatthings are like. But, if a statement is analytical, then it is impossible toimagine or conceive of what things must be like for the statement to befalse. It is generally because we consider PNC to be an a priori and analytictruth that we consider it to be a necessary truth: for any statement, it is