Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

172 PHENOMENALISM AND RELATIVISMthe source of phenomenalism and relativism may be ethical or pragmatic,not metaphysical. For if we bear in mind that his overall aim here is todefend PNC conceived as a metaphysical principle, then we can appreciatewhy he concentrates in particular on metaphysical sources ofphenomenalism and relativism.But <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s approach here, and especially his response tophenomenalism and relativism, may also stimulate us to examine our ownconfidence that epistemological claims can be entirely divorced frommetaphysical claims. For we will see that he has what appears to be aforceful and non-dogmatic response to a radical dissociation ofepistemology from metaphysics; for, in his response to phenomenalism andrelativism, he argues that there is not a sharp distinction between, on theone hand, how things appear to us and how we conceive them (hencethings considered from the point of view of our natural search forknowledge, which starts with how things appear to us) and, on the otherhand, the things themselves. On the contrary, he argues that, on the onehand, our natural search for knowledge must start with things as theyappear to us and as we conceive them; but that, on the other hand, it isprecisely the things themselves that we are investigating in this search forknowledge. So, if we find this view attractive, i.e. the view which says thatthere is a seamless continuum between appearances and the thingsthemselves, we may ourselves be less inclined to assume thatepistemological claims, i.e. claims about things as they appear to us andfrom the standpoint of our natural search for knowledge, can be readilydivorced from metaphysical claims, i.e. claims about the things themselves.So we can see why, in general, <strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks that the view that thingsare radically indeterminate, and hence the radical denial of PNC, standsand falls with phenomenalism and relativism. But he presents a complexargument for this conclusion, which we will consider next.iiTracing the source of phenomenalism and of the denialof PNCSTEP 1At the opening of IV. 5, <strong>Aristotle</strong> states that the source of the radicaldenial of PNC is, precisely, phenomenalism, and that these two viewsstand and fall together (see 1009 a 6–7). In other words: