Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

178 PHENOMENALISM AND RELATIVISMAs we might say, it may be possible for God, or in general for a beingwhose knowledge does not at all depend on sense perception and onappearances based on sense perception, to think and speak of the thingsthemselves, even if this is not possible for us, or, in general, for a beingwhose knowledge depends on sense perception and on appearances basedon sense perception. According to claim 11, there may be true and falsestatements about the things themselves, i.e. statements that truly or falselystate what the things themselves are like, even if we cannot entertain suchstatements—perhaps God alone can entertain such statements. We cannotentertain such statements because, according to claim 7, we can only thinkand speak about things as they appear to us and as we conceive them; wecannot think or speak of the things themselves.So what must we add to claims 2, 3 and 7 in order to ensure that thecombination of these claims entails not only that all our appearances andall our beliefs are true of things as they appear to us and as we conceivethem (i.e. claim 10), but that all our appearances and all our beliefs are,simply, true (i.e. phenomenalism) ? Evidently, we must add that:12. It is impossible to think or speak of the things themselves; andthis is impossible in principle, not just for us.But, apparently, the best way of defending claim 12 is, precisely to claimthat:13. The things themselves are so radically indeterminate that it isimpossible to think and speak of them (i.e. this is impossible inprinciple, not just for us).This is precisely the claim that Kratylus, and in general the followers ofHeracleitus as <strong>Aristotle</strong> understands them, defend (see 1010 a 7–15). Inparticular, they defend this claim by arguing that:14. All things change always and in every way, and there is nothingconstant about anything.So they argue that things are radically indeterminate because things changealways and in every way and nothing is constant about anything; and theyconclude that it is impossible to think and speak about things (i.e. this isimpossible in principle, not just for us). But, as <strong>Aristotle</strong> understands them,they defend these claims (i.e. 13 and 14) in order to defendphenomenalism and the radical denial of PNC (we recall that the radical