Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

72 ARISTOTLE’S METHOD IN METAPHYSICSAn aporia provides direction and aim to a search because of its logicaland dilemmatic structure, i.e. its being a question with two apparentlyopposite and conflicting sides, with good reasons on both sides. Consider,for example, the central question of metaphysics, ‘What is being?’ Asstated, it is not yet an aporia, although it may be closely associated withaporiai; for it is not structured as an aporia, i.e. as a question that has twosides. At the same time, and apparently because it is not yet structured asan aporia, this question does not indicate any directions for searching, andit may even appear to be without aim. But now let us suppose that thisquestion, ‘What is being?’, is associated with a particular aporia about thenature of being, such as: ‘Is being primarily something particular orsomething general?’ (see the last aporia, number 15, in book III). Supposealso that we have some initial grasp of why both answers to this questionappear genuinely attractive. Then our search is provided with direction andaim. For we know what in general we have to do to answer a dilemma:either defend the one side; or the other side; or argue that the two sides canafter all be reconciled. So we immediately have available certain paths forsearching.On the other hand, it is also worth pointing out that these paths forsearching may not be as clearly and distinctly marked out as we might think.For an important part of the search for an answer to an aporia will involvegiving an adequate account of the central concepts in the aporia; forexample, the concepts of particulars and universals. But in giving such anaccount it may emerge that different answers to the aporia are called for,depending on how its central concepts are understood. So the paths forsearching generated by an aporia may depend on how the central conceptsin the aporia are understood.But it is also important not to misunderstand this point. For it does notmean that we must first clarify the concepts and engage in what today issometimes called conceptual analysis, before we may try to answer theaporia. On the contrary, the conceptual inquiry is itself an integral part ofthe attempt to answer the aporia. Indeed, it is the endeavour to answer theaporia that generates the need for, and gives direction to, the conceptualinquiry. Without aporiai, conceptual inquiries are themselves aimless—andperhaps pointless.A particular aporia evidently provides us with a way of telling (acriterion) when a search has been successfully completed, that is, when theaporia has been adequately answered. So an aporia contributes not only ameans of searching, but also a criterion of finding. However, this aporiabasedcriterion of finding is neither infallible nor definitive. It is notinfallible, since there is nothing in <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s general conception of an