Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

210 THE SEARCH FOR PRIMARY BEINGwhich itself is not further said of [or predicated, i.e. true of] anotherthing.(1028 b 36–37)But he argues that this is not a sufficient condition for primary being. Forif primary being were simply the ultimate subject of predication, then itwould follow that matter (hulē), which, in virtue of itself, is somethingindeterminate, is primary being:We have now said in rough outline what ousia [i.e. primary being]might be, namely, what is not itself said of an underlying thing[hupokeimenon] but of which the other things are said. But we oughtnot to speak in this way alone; for it is not sufficient. For this is itselfunclear, and it also follows that matter [hulē] would be ousia.(1029 a 7–10)But it emerges that the reason why primary being cannot be matter is,exactly, that matter is, in virtue of itself, something indeterminate:By matter I mean that which, in virtue of itself [kath’ hautēn], is saidto be neither a what [ti, probably short for tode ti, i.e. particular witha certain essence], nor a quantity, nor any other thing through whichbeing [to on] is determined [hōristai]. For it [i.e. matter] issomething of which of all these are said, but whose mode of being isdifferent from each of the kinds of things that are said.(1029 a 20–21)To understand why <strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks that matter is, in virtue of itself,something indeterminate, we must recall that, in his view, matter is alwaysto be understood in relation to form, i.e. the form which makes thematerial thing into the determinate and well-defined thing that it is (seeabove, Chapter 2§4, especially ii, i.e. the conception of matter aspotentiality). For example, the bricks and timber of a particular house arethe matter of the house only in relation to the form of the house, thestructural principle which, when combined with the bricks and timber,results in the house. By themselves, the bricks and timber are not thematter of the house; for they might not have been formed into a house,but into a different kind of material thing, and perhaps they might evenhave been left unformed into any material thing. So the account of thematter of a material thing, e.g. of a house, must always mention the formof the material thing whose matter it is. In other words, matter can be