Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

84 ARISTOTLE’S METHOD IN METAPHYSICSeven the basis of, metaphysics? We will take up this question at length inChapters 5 and 6.Third Aporia (997 a 15–25)Is it the task of a single science to investigate all beings, or is it the task offundamentally different sciences to investigate different kinds of beings?This aporia raises a most pressing question about the possibility ofmetaphysics: how is it even possible to conceive of all beings and of beingas a whole? This problem is restated in a different and apparently moretechnical way in the seventh aporia (see especially 998 b 22–27), where<strong>Aristotle</strong> asks whether there is such a thing as a single whole or kind, being,and answers that there is a problem with thinking that there is. We willtake up this general aporia at length in Chapter 4§1–3.Fourth Aporia (997 a 25–34)Is the task of metaphysics only to investigate the (primary) beings or also toinvestigate the common characteristics of the (primary) beings?For example, suppose that all beings share the characteristic of beingextended. Is it, then, the task of metaphysics also to investigate things in sofar as they are extended, i.e. to investigate the properties of things in so faras they are extended? For example, is it part of metaphysics to investigatethe properties of lines, circles, etc? But then, apparently, metaphysics willinclude, or even collapse into, geometry. We will take up this aporia inChapter 4§1.Fifth Aporia (997 a 34–998 a 19)Do only sense-perceptible things exist or do non-sense-perceptible things exist,too, in addition to or besides (para) sense-perceptible ones?The first four aporiai were concerned with the nature and possibility ofmetaphysics—they were about metaphysics. But this and the followingaporiai are aporiai within metaphysics. The present aporia takes up thequestion, What basically is there? Only sense-perceptible things, or alsonon-sense-perceptible things? We may note that the reality of senseperceptiblethings is taken for granted here, the question being whether, ‘inaddition to’ or ‘besides’ (para) these, we should suppose that non-senseperceptiblethings are real. It is also important to note that by ‘senseperceptiblethings’ (aisthēta) he means ‘changing things’ (kinoumena); andby ‘non-sense-perceptible things’ he means ‘changeless things’ (akinēta).