Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

at least human rational thought, is a kind of change, for he argues that ifthe soul contains reason (nous), then it contains change (kinēsis, see Sophist249a). It certainly appears natural to think that rational thought is a kindof change, and <strong>Aristotle</strong> concedes that this is true of human rationalthought (1075 a 5–10). But he argues that God’s rational thought isdifferent. It is true, he says, that even human thought can momentarilyfocus its undivided attention purely on a single and wholly unitary thingwithout parts; and to that extent even human thought is changeless. But thisis only a momentary state, and in general human thought consists in thechanging attention of the intellect from one thing, or one part or aspect ofa thing, to another. Indeed even when our mental attention comes to aunitary resting point, it does so only as a result of having completed aprocess of reasoning, i.e. having mentally and through reasoning ‘runthrough’ a number of different things. Human thought, we may say, isessentially discursive (‘running through’). But <strong>Aristotle</strong> argues that God’sthought is unlike human thought; it is not discursive, in that it is always ofone and the same thing, and of something that is perfectly unitary anduniform, namely, God itself:For it is evident that it [reason, the ultimate cause of change] thinksthe most divine and worthy thing, and it does not alter; foralteration would be for the worse, and that would already be a kindof change.(1074 b 25–27)He concludes that:THE ULTIMATE CAUSE OF CHANGE: GOD 291just as human reason…is in this state from time to time…, so therational thought that has itself as object [i.e. God’s rational thought]is in this state in all eternity.(1075 a 7–10)This shows, <strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks, that God’s thought is indeed changeless. Butwe may still be left with the feeling that the puzzle has not gone away. Hehas perhaps shown that God’s thought is completely changeless, since it isalways of the same perfectly unitary and uniform object. But then, we maywonder, how can this thought, if it is so utterly changeless, still be a kind ofactivity? <strong>Aristotle</strong> may have an answer, but it is not clear what it is.