Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

ARISTOTLE’S METHOD IN METAPHYSICS 85The way in which the aporia is presented may suggest that <strong>Aristotle</strong> sidesentirely with the one side (only sense-perceptible things are real), and thatit is Plato and the Platonists that take up the other side (also non-senseperceptiblethings are real). He may also give the impression that noreconciliation is possible between the two sides. But these impressions aremisleading. For <strong>Aristotle</strong> will argue, just like Plato, that explanations andexplanatory knowledge requires the reality of non-sense-perceptible andchangeless things. The disagreement with Plato is rather about how thetwo types of things —changing and sense-perceptible things as opposed tochangeless and non-sense-perceptible things—are related to each other. Inparticular, are they two sets of distinct things, so that it is in this sense thatnon-sense-perceptible things exist ‘in addition to’ or ‘besides’ (para) senseperceptibleones? This is Plato’s view, as <strong>Aristotle</strong> understands it. Or can asingle thing be both sense-perceptible and non-sense-perceptible, bothchanging and changeless? This is the solution that <strong>Aristotle</strong> will defend.We will take up this aporia at length in in Chapters 7 and 9.Sixth Aporia (998 a 20– b 13)Are the principles of a thing the kinds to which the thing belongs or are theyrather the ultimate elements that are present in the thing and compose thething?This important aporia is a variation of the central aporia (especially thefifteenth): are the principles of things general or particular? It arises especiallyfrom the very notion of a principle: ‘It is common to all principles [of athing] to be the starting-point from which [the thing] either comes to beor is or is known’ (Metaphysics VI. 1, 1013 a 17–19). For if a principle of athing is the starting-point from which the thing is or comes to be, thenthis principle will apparently be the ultimate parts and elements out ofwhich the thing is composed. But if, on the other hand, the principle of athing is the starting-point from which the thing is known, i.e.explanatorily and scientifically known, then the principle will apparentlybe rather the general kind to which the thing belongs. For explanatoryknowledge requires knowledge of the general kinds to which thingsbelong. But <strong>Aristotle</strong> argues that a principle of a thing must explain both,on the one hand, what it is, and, on the other hand, how it comes to beand how it is knowable and explicable. So this is apparently how the aporiaarises. We will take up this aporia in Chapter 7, especially §5vi–vii.