Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

THE SEARCH FOR PRIMARY BEING 229him in experience, is not just the human being, but also the snub-nosedthing, the five foot tall thing, etc. But a thing, in the sense of the ultimatesubject of predication, can still be identical with its essence. For theultimate subject of predication evidently does not include the accidentalproperties. For an accidental property, e.g. being snub-nosed, is somethingpredicated of and true of something that is already a determinate and welldefinedthing, e.g. a human being. an accidental property belongs not tothe ultimate subject of predication, but to what is predicated of and true ofthis subject. In general it is important to emphasize that to speak of a thingin the sense of an ultimate subject of predication is not to speak of a thingas we encounter it in experience, and in general it is not to speak of a thingin a wide and loose sense of ‘thing’. So a thing in the sense of an ultimatesubject of predication can be identical with its essence, even though thething in a wider and looser sense will evidently include more than itsessence.However, it may still be an open question whether, at the end of theday, <strong>Aristotle</strong> succeeds in defending the view that a thing, in the sense ofan ultimate subject of predication, is identical with its essence. For thereremains the following problem. Of what are the things that are predicatedof a material thing, and in particular the accidental properties of thematerial thing, ultimately predicated? Are the accidental propertiesultimately predicated of the whole that results from both form and matter,i.e. are they predicated of the sunholon, or are they rather ultimatelypredicated only of the form and the essence? To defend the view that athing, in the sense of an ultimate subject of predication, is identical withits essence, <strong>Aristotle</strong> must evidently argue that the latter is the case, i.e. it isthe essence and the form that is the ultimate subject of predication, not thewhole that results from both form and matter (the sunholon). For his claimis, precisely, that the essence and the form are identical with the ultimatesubject of predication. But how can he argue that the accidental propertiesare ultimately predicated of the essence and form, and not of the wholethat results from both the form and the matter (the sunholon)? To arguethis, he will no doubt once again invoke the claim that the whole thatresults from form and matter (the sunholon) is a determinate and welldefinedthing, hence a being in the first place, only because of its essenceand form. And it is of a thing that is already determinate and well-definedthat the accidental properties are true; for example, being pale or snubnosedare true of a thing that is already determinate and well-defined, e.g.a particular human being.