Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

THE ULTIMATE EXPLANATIONS OF ALL THINGS 47things, and investigates them in so far as they are extended, etc.Metaphysics, on the other hand, investigates simply beings, and itinvestigates them simply in so far as they are.<strong>Aristotle</strong> shares with Plato these fundamental requirements forexplanation (R1–5)—though they disagree fundamentally about whatthings have essences. But in the Posterior Analytics <strong>Aristotle</strong> developed atheory of the structure of explanation and explanatory reasoning, based onhis theory of the structure of deductive reasoning, which he developed inthe Prior Analytics. According to this theory, explanatory reasoning, whichhe calls ‘demonstration’ (apodeixis), is a kind of deductive reasoning(sullogismos). For a piece of deductive reasoning to constitute ademonstration, it must be an explanatory deductive reasoning (sullogismosepistēmonikos, see Posterior Analytics I. 2, 71 b 17–19). This means that thetruth of the premises in the deductive reasoning must not only entail thatthe conclusion is true, it must also explain why the conclusion is true. Todo so, the premises must in general be more explanatory than theconclusion. So <strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks that explanatory knowledge (epistēmē) aimsat demonstration, i.e. at using deductive reasoning to derive explanatoryconclusions from more explanatory premises; and he thinks that there arepremises that are most explanatory and cannot themselves be explainedfurther. These are the premises that state the first and ultimateexplanations.Finally, there is a basic supposition in <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s (and Plato’s)conception of science, which is so evident to him that he nowhereexpressly states or considers it (the same is true of Plato). But thissupposition is one that we may disagree with, so it is important to make itexplicit.R6. SCIENTIFIC REALISMIt is things that have explanations, and explanations are themselvesthings and features of things. So explanations are things and features ofthings, not what we think or say about things. Of course, if we knowthings that explain other things, and, if we know that, and how theyexplain other things, then we have explanatory knowledge of things. And<strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks that such knowledge can be stated in statements. Still,explanations are things, not our thoughts or statements about things. Aswe would say, he thinks that explanations are independent of us, ourthought and our language. So he thinks that essences, too, which is whatexplanations are based in, are independent of us, our thought andlanguage. The same is true of the general kinds to which things belong,