Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

76 ARISTOTLE’S METHOD IN METAPHYSICSHowever, there are serious problems with this interpretation. First ofall, the whole emphasis in book III is on aporiai and on the claim that ourrecognition of and engagement with aporiai is what enables us to search inmetaphysics. There is no appeal to endoxa, and no claim that it is they thatenable us to search in metaphysics. It is of course true that earlier thinkersgenerally disagree with each other, and with the opinions pre-reflectivelyshared by people. But it would be wrong to think that, in <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s view,every conflict of opinion, or even every conflict of reputable opinions,gives rise to an aporia. For we need to recall that an aporia, in the sense ofa particular puzzle and problem, is what causes puzzlement; it causespuzzlement because we are rationally pulled in apparently opposite andconflicting directions. But this means that one must oneself find that bothsides are credible; it is not enough that different people should find thedifferent sides credible. For in that case the puzzle and problem, if it is oneat all, would not necessarily cause any puzzlement. But this stronglysuggests that thinking of the aporia-based method as simply a variation ofan endoxic method is decisively inadequate; for it does not show why it isindeed aporiai that are essential to the aporia-based method.But there is also a clear textual problem with thinking that the aporiabasedmethod is simply a variation of an endoxic method. For at theopening of book III <strong>Aristotle</strong> says something that plainly suggests thatalthough some of the material for his aporiai is obtained from his predecessors,other material may so far have been overlooked by everyone andhe may be the first to recognize it:With a view to the science that we are seeking [i.e. metaphysics], wemust first turn to those things about which we need above all toraise aporiai, that is, the things about which certain others have heldopposed views as well as anything besides these that happens to havebeen overlooked.(995 a 24–27)So it is not true that each side of an aporia in metaphysics must representan already held opinion; on the contrary, there may be aporiai that have sofar been overlooked. That there is such a non-endoxic and non-doxastic(from doxa, ‘opinion’) aspect to <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s metaphysical aporiai is furthersuggested when he goes on to say that:there is no resolution [of an aporia] if one fails to recognize the knot[i.e. the aporia]. Rather, the aporia in our thought indicates this [i.e.a knot] in the object.