Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

180 PHENOMENALISM AND RELATIVISMsource of phenomenalism; he has not yet introduced relativism. Heintroduces relativism (in IV. 6) as follows:[1011 a 17–20] But if it is not the case that all things are relative [prosti], but there are also some things that are themselves by themselves[auta kath’ hauta, i.e. if some things are what they are not in virtue oftheir relation to other things, but simply in virtue of themselves],then it will not be the case that all appearance is true [i.e.phenomenalism will be false]. For an appearance is an appearancefor someone [i.e. relative to someone], So those who claim that allappearances are true make all beings relative [pros ti).[ a 21–24] For this reason, too, those who want to trace the force ofthe argument, and who at the same time are prepared to submitto argument, must take care to assert not that appearance is true [i.e.phenomenalism], but rather that appearance is true to the one towhom it appears, and at the time when it appears, and in the respect inwhich it appears, and In the way in which it appears [i.e. relativism].(1011 a 17–24)Here <strong>Aristotle</strong> makes two claims: first (1011 a 17–20), phenomenalism, i.e.the view that all appearances (and all beliefs) are true, entails metaphysicalrelativism, i.e. it entails the view that:(REL-M) All things are what they are relative to other things, andnothing is what it is simply in virtue of itself.Second (1011 a 21–24), if we observe that phenomenalism entailsmetaphysical relativism, and if at the same time we take account of thebest line of reasoning in support of phenomenalism (i.e. the reasoning setout in IV. 5, which we have traced above), then we will recognize that thisline of reasoning leads not so much to phenomenalism, but to relativism,i.e. it leads to the view that:(REL) Anything that appears thus and so to someone, and anythingthat someone believes to be thus and so, is thus and so for him (i.e.all appearances and all beliefs are true relative to the one who has them).His argument for these two claims is highly compressed, but perhaps it canbe understood as follows. First, why does he think that phenomenalismentails metaphysical relativism? Suppose that there is a thing that is F not