Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

THE SEARCH FOR PRIMARY BEING 253ixIs the essence and the form of each particular thing auniversal, a particular, or both?Does <strong>Aristotle</strong> think that the essence and the form of each particular thing(e.g. Socrates) is a universal, a particular, or both? We recall that, with regardto changing, material things, which are the remit of his consideration here(i.e. in the central books of the Metaphysics, books VII–IX), he argues thatthe essence and the form are one and the same (see §5vii of this chapter).But what is the essence and the form: a universal, a particular, or both?There are really three possibilities, not just two:(1) the essence and form is a universal only;(2) the essence and form is a particular only;(3) the essence and form is both a particular and a universal.It has emerged that <strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks that the essence and the form is aparticular. For he argues that the essence and the form of a particularchanging, material thing (e.g. Socrates) is identical with the ultimatesubject of predication with regard to that thing. But the ultimate subject ofpredication is evidently a particular. The view that the essence and form isidetical with the ultimate subject of predication is of absolutely centralimportance. For it means that the relation between a particular thing (e.g.Socrates), in the sense of an ultimate subject of predication, and its essenceand form is the relation between a thing and itself. It is because of thecentral importance of this view that it is important to recognize that, for<strong>Aristotle</strong>, the essence and form of a changing, material thing is a particular.It is true, however, that there is a very different interpretation, whichargues that, for <strong>Aristotle</strong>, the essence and form of a changing, material thingis a universal, namely, the species to which the thing belongs. We have setout this alternative interpretation at the end of §5v and especially §5viii ofthis chapter.So we may conclude that, for <strong>Aristotle</strong>, the essence and form of achanging, material thing is a particular. Still, this leaves the questionwhether the essence and form is only a particular or also a universal.Certainly, the essence and form is primarily a particular. For it is identicalwith the ultimate subject of predication, which is a particular. But perhapsthe essence and form is also a universal, as a consequence of being aparticular. Perhaps this is just what <strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks.To decide this question, we need to ask why exactly the essence and theform of a changing, material thing is a particular. The reason why this is so