Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

THE SEARCH FOR PRIMARY BEING 247Again it directly follows that no universal is a primary being. P3 is, ofcourse, based on the view, which he defended earlier, that primary beingwith regard to each particular thing is identical with that thing, i.e. with theultimate subject of predication (see §5v). So primary being is not said of,i.e. it is not true of the ultimate subject of predication; for it simply is theultimate subject of predication.We have seen that a central assumption behind these two arguments, forthe view that no universal is a primary being, is that primary being withregard to a particular (e.g. Socrates) cannot be shared by other particulars(e.g. Plato). But how is this assumption consistent with <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s viewthat the primary being of something is its essence? He explicitly identifiesprimary being with essence in 1038 b 14–15, quoted above, relying on whathe had argued earlier in book VII. But he also thinks that Socrates andPlato belong to the same kind and species, since they are both human. So,apparently, they share the same essence. The inconsistency arises if<strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks that the essence of something (e.g. Socrates) is the kindand species to which the thing belongs (e.g. the species, being human). Forthen he will be holding a set of claims that are obviously inconsistent:(1) Socrates and Plato do not share the same primary being and essence;(2) the primary being and the essence of Socrates and Plato are the kindand the species to which they belong; and(3) Socrates and Plato belong to the same kind and species.<strong>Aristotle</strong> expressly makes claim 1 here (certainly he does so on the aboveinterpretation; see below for a very different interpretation). But 3 is ageneral view of his. So if he is not to be inconsistent, he must deny 2, i.e.he must deny that the primary being and the essence of a particular are thekind and the species to which the particular belongs. In fact the denial of 2follows directly from the view that no universal is a primary being; for akind and species is evidently a universal. So when <strong>Aristotle</strong> argues that nouniversal is a primary being, he is immediately committed to denying thatprimary being is a kind or species. In other words, primary being with regardto a particular (e.g. Socrates) is not the kind or species to which the particularbelongs. And since he identifies primary being with essence, it is likewisetrue that primary being with regard to a particular (e.g. Socrates) is not thekind or species to which the particular belongs. Aristotelian essences are notkinds or species.