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Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

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THE DEFENCE OF PNC 129<str<strong>on</strong>g>Aristotle</str<strong>on</strong>g> characterizes PNC as a ‘principle of reas<strong>on</strong>ing’ (sullogistikēarchē, 1005 b 7) and as an ‘axiom’ in just the sense of a ‘principle ofreas<strong>on</strong>ing’ (see 1005 a 20). He argues that PNC is true of all things, andthat every<strong>on</strong>e and all sciences make use of it. So he thinks that PNC is aprinciple of all reas<strong>on</strong>ing. But an axiom, as he uses the term ‘axiom’, issomething that <strong>on</strong>e must presuppose if <strong>on</strong>e is to learn anything (seePosterior Analytics I. 2, 72 a 16–17). Hence PNC is a principle of allreas<strong>on</strong>ing in the sense that if <strong>on</strong>e is to reas<strong>on</strong> at all about anything, and solearn anything in a way that involves reas<strong>on</strong>ing, <strong>on</strong>e must presuppose PNC.Unfortunately, he does not spell out how we presuppose PNC in allreas<strong>on</strong>ing. In the Prior Analytics he uses the term ‘reas<strong>on</strong>ing’ (sullogismos)in particular to mean ‘deductive argument’ (I. 1, 24 b 18–20). So apparentlyhis view is that we presuppose PNC in all deductive argument. But hedoes not say how we do this.Here is an attempt to show how we presuppose PNC in all deductiveargument. A deductively valid argument is an argument in which, if thepremises are true, then necessarily the c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong> is also true:A deducti<strong>on</strong> [sullogismos] is an argument in which, if certain things aresupposed [i.e. the truth of the premises], then something other thanthe things supposed [i.e. the c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong> and its truth] follows ofnecessity from their being true [i.e. from the premises being true].(Prior Analytics, I. 1, 24 b 18–20)In short, a deductively valid argument is an argument in which thepremises entail the c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong>. But this means that, in a deductively validargument, to assert the premises and deny the c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong> is to assert ac<strong>on</strong>tradicti<strong>on</strong>. This shows that the principle that it is impossible to assert ac<strong>on</strong>tradicti<strong>on</strong>, i.e. the principle of n<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>tradicti<strong>on</strong> in <strong>on</strong>e of itsformulati<strong>on</strong>s, is part of the definiti<strong>on</strong> of a deductively valid argument. Forthe impossibility, in a deductively valid argument, of asserting the premisesbut denying the c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong>, is precisely the impossibility of asserting ac<strong>on</strong>tradicti<strong>on</strong>. So, if we think that some arguments are deductively valid,we must think that it is impossible to assert a c<strong>on</strong>tradicti<strong>on</strong>. In short, PNCis part of the c<strong>on</strong>cept of deductive validity, and it is in this way that wepresuppose PNC in all deductive argument.However, to c<strong>on</strong>clude that we presuppose PNC in all reas<strong>on</strong>ing, andnot just in all deductive reas<strong>on</strong>ing and deductive argument, wemust suppose that <str<strong>on</strong>g>Aristotle</str<strong>on</strong>g> thinks that deductive argument is central to allreas<strong>on</strong>ing and rati<strong>on</strong>al thought, and that there would be no reas<strong>on</strong>ing orrati<strong>on</strong>al thought if there were no deductive argument. Or at least we must

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